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WHEN DOCTRINES COLLIDE: CORPORATE 
NEGLIGENCE AND RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR 
WHEN HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES FAIL TO SPEAK 
UP* 
I. TROTI'ER HARDY, JR.** 
I. Introduction 
A hospitalized patient injured by the negligence of a nurse1 
can bring suit against the hospital because the nurse is a hospi-
tal employee. A hospitalized patient injured by the negligence of 
a private physician cannot bring suit against the hospital be-
cause the physician is not a hospital employee. Can a patient sue 
the hospital when a nurse is negligent, if at all, only for not 
speaking up about a private physician's negligence? Courts have 
given this question a variety of answers over the last fifty years, 
few of them satisfactory, and some of them simply wrong. The 
question is vexing precisely because it arises at the intersection 
of two separate lines of cases against hospitals, both based on 
the theory of respondeat superior. 
Simple cases of nursing negligence, without the complica-
tion of a physician's mistake, form the first line; they rarely pose 
problems for courts today. With a few exceptions,2 all jurisdic-
* Thanks to Helen Adkins for untiring cheerfulness and accuracy in processing 
most of these words ten times over. 
** Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William 
and Mary; B.A., University of Virginia (1968); M.S., American University (1974); J.D., 
Duke University (1981). 
1. I refer throughout the Article to nurses instead of other hospital employees be-
cause most of the cases I rely on have dealt with nurses. The Article's reasoning and 
conclusions also apply to other employees like physical therapists, respiratory therapists, 
and laboratory technicians. 
2. Until1957, New York was the most notable exception. In Schloendorffv. Society 
of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), the court held that when a charitable 
hospital's professional employees exercised their professional discretion, the hospital was 
not vicariously liable for their conduct, because the employees acted independently of 
the hospital's control. The New York Court of Appeals overturned this rule in Bing v. 
Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957). In Bing, Justice Fuld ob-
served that the rule had singled out hospitals for anomalous treatment. If applied uni-
formly to other enterprises, the rule, said Justice Fuld, would result in an airline having 
no liability for the negligence of its pilots, a railroad having no liability for the negligence 
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tions allow suits against hospitals based on respondeat superior 
in this situation, as long as governmental and charitable immu-
nities are not in issue. 3 Examples of nursing negligence for which 
the employing hospital can be held liable include not checking a 
patient's transfusion needle often enough/ improperly moving a 
patient so that a recent incision is re-opened, 5 and using the 
wrong type of hypodermic needle for an injection. 6 
For years, however, in a second line of cases courts reso-
lutely denied the liability of hospitals on a respondeat superior 
theory when a private physician negligently treated a patient in 
of its engineers, and a chemical company having no liability for the negligence of its 
chemists. Id. at 662, 143 N.E.2d at 6, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 8. The law in England evidently 
went through a similar evolution, ending with Lord Denning's observation that vicarious 
liability, even for professional acts of employees, "all seems so clear on principle that one 
wonders why there should ever have been any doubt about it." Cassidy v. Ministry of 
Health, [1951) 2 K.B. 343, 360 (C.A.). 
Although Schloendorff dealt specifically with charitable hospitals, other states 
adopted a similar rule for proprietary hospitals. Georgia, for example, still appears to 
relieve a hospital of vicarious liability when a nurse exercises medical judgment, at least 
in the presence of and under the direction of a physician who is not also a hospital 
employee. See Moore v. Carrington, 155 Ga. App. 12, 270 S.E.2d 222 (1980); Porter v. 
Patterson, 107 Ga. App. 64, 129 S.E.2d 70 (1962). Courts most commonly seem to discuss 
the question of physicians' direction and control in the context of the operating room. 
See, e.g., Beaches Hosp. v. Lee, 384 So. 2d 234, 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (sponge 
count error). But see. Burroughs v. Board of Trustees of Alachua Gen. Hosp., 377 So. 2d 
801, 804-05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (nurse acted under doctor's orders in administering 
a drug to a mental patient and in helping the patient to be discharged); Moore v. Car-
rington, 155 Ga. App. 12, 270 S.E.2d 222 (1980) (emergency room treatment). When a 
surgeon directs and controls an operating room nurse, the surgeon sometimes is said to 
borrow the nurse under the borrowed servant doctrine, rendering the surgeon vicariously 
liable for the nurse's negligence. See Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo. App. 374, 377-78, 570 P.2d 
544, 549-50 (1977); Baird v. Sickler, 69 Ohio St. 2d 652, 654-55, 433 N.E.2d 593, 594-95 
(1982) (per curiam) (chief surgeon held liable for the negligence of a nurse-anesthetist); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227 (1957). See generally Currier v. Abbott, 104 
N.H. 299, 302, 185 A.2d 263, 266 (1962) (citing RESTATEMF;NT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227 
(1957)). The borrowed servant doctrine is declining. See, e.g., Sparger v. Worley Hosp., 
547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977); Hanson & Stromberg, Hospital Liability for Negligence, 21 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 9-10 (1969). Nevertheless, as the cases noted above indicate, the doc-
trine still has some vitality. It seems safe to say that most jurisdictions today hold a 
hospital vicariously liable for the negligence of its employed nurses. See generally 1 D. 
LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1J 16A.02 (1986). 
3. Most states have abolished charitable and governmental immunity for hospitals. 
For a state by state listing, see 1 S. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE §§ 3:31, 3:32 (1980 & Supp. 1986). 
4. Sherman v. Hartman, 137 Cal. App. 2d 589, 290 P.2d 894 (1955). 
5. McElroy v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 163 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Ark. 
1958). 
6. Su v. Perkins, 133 Ga. App. 474, 211 S.E.2d 421 (1974). 
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the hospital. The prevailing judicial attitude was that hospitals 
only undertake to provide a facility for the convenience of physi-
cians and patients. Because they do not treat or attempt to cure 
patients, hospitals do not directly owe a medical duty to pa-
tients. Judges frequently observed, even as late as 1967, that 
hospitals are merely specialized hotels that cannot provide medi-
cal care,7 and that a hospital can neither control nor be responsi-
ble for the acts of physicians because they are independent con-
tractors.8 The reasoning in these cases almost always begged the 
question of hospital liability: hospitals were not liable because 
they owed no medical duty to patients. They owed no duty be-
cause courts were unwilling to hold that they did owe a duty. 9 
7. See Alden v. Providence Hosp., 382 F.2d 163, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (A hospital is "essentially a custodial institu-
tion."); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 414, 227 N.E.2d 296, 299, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373, 
378 (1967) (A hospital "serves the function only of a specialized facility, not a direct 
service healing institution."); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 130, 
105 N.E. 92, 94 (1914) ("The hospital does not undertake to act through [physicians], 
but merely to procure them to act upon their own responsibility."); Steinert v. Bruns-
wick Home, Inc., 172 Misc. 787, 790, 16 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (1939), aff'd, 259 A.D. 1018, 20 
N.Y.S.2d 459 (1940) (A "hospital undertakes, not to heal or attempt to heal through the 
agency of others, but merely to supply others who will heal or attempt to heal on their 
own responsibility.") (quoting Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hosp., 236 N.Y. 268, 270, 140 
N.E. 694, 695 (1923)). 
8. E.g., Moon v. Mercy Hosp., 150 Colo. 430, 373 P.2d 944 (1962);_ Vanaman v. 
Milford Memorial Hosp., 272 A.2d 718 (Del. 1970); Overstreet v. Doctors Hosp., 142 Ga: 
App. 895, 237 S.E.2d 213 (1977). 
9. Neither the hotel analogy nor the independent contractor defense ever made a 
great deal of sense. First, courts never declared hotels to be free of responsibility for 
injuries to guests. On the contrary, hotels have long been obliged to exercise at least 
reasonable care for the safety of their guests. See R ANDERSON, THE HoTELMAN's BASIC 
LAW§ 5:8(b), at 60 (1965); P. VANZILE, ELEMENTS oF THE LAw oF BAILMENTS AND CARRI-
ERS, INCLUDING PLEDGE AND PAWN AND INNKEEPERS§ 368, at 341-42 (1902). The obliga-
tion extends to the protection of guests against harm from third parties when the hotel 
"actually knows that its guest is being harmed but takes no steps to stop the wrong-
doer." R ANDERSON, supra § 5:8(c), at 61. "The innkeeper, while not an insurer of a 
guest against personal injury, must protect him against injury from third persons so far 
as it is within his power to do so." J. BEALE, THE LAw OF INNKEEPERS AND HoTELs§ 171, 
at 118 (1906). The hotel analogy, in short, has always offered a sound reason for holding 
hospitals liable when, through an employee, they actually knew a patient was being 
harmed and when protecting the patient was within the hospital's power. 
Second, a hospital's staff physicians (i.e., nonemployee physicians With privileges to 
treat patients at a hospital) are not simply independent contractors whose services are 
paid for by the hospital in the way a property owner might contract with and pay some-
one to build a house. Instead, the relationship between hospital and physician is analo-
gous to that of landowner and concessionaire, which has been sufficient to impose liabil-
ity on the landowner for at least fifty years. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 415 
(1966); Goldberg, The Duty of Hospitals and Hospital Medical Staffs to Regulate the 
Quality of Patient Care: A Legal Perspective, 14 PAC. L.J. 55, 58 (1982). Section 415 of 
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Whatever the soundness of this reasoning, a long line of cases 
declared firmly that hospitals are not liable for the negligence of 
private physicians.10 
These two firmly entrenched doctrines distinguishing 
nurses' ahd physicians' negligence collide in the factual situation 
at issue in this Article. This situation, which for convenience I 
call the speaking up case, presents a physician negligently treat-
ing a patient, and a nurse or other hospital employee observing 
the negligent treatment. The injured patient sues the hospital 
on the grounds that its employee should have prevented or cor-
rected this treatment. 
Several analytical approaches to this situation are possible. 
One is to view a case as falling under the second line of cases, 
those that follow a general rule that hospitals are not liable for 
physicians' negligence. Courts taking this approach simply con-
clude that the hospital is not liable, without further analysis of 
law or policy-and without further discussion in this Article. 
Other courts follow the first line of cases, positing that nurses 
the Restatement imposes liability on a landowner when the activities of a concessionaire 
are "unreasonably dangerous." Providing medical treatment to a patient is not the sort 
of thing that a court ordinarily would consider to be unreasonably dangerous, but on 
occasion it might well be. See, e.g., Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 
280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967) (radical spinal surgery was not used by any physician except the 
defendant, and resulted in the patient's death). 
Further, even by 1966, the Second Restatement had asserted that the "independent 
contractor" defense to liability was subject to exceptions "so numerous, and [that] have 
so far eroded the 'general rule,' [of immunity] that it can now be said to be 'general' only 
in the sense that it is applied [when] no good reason is found for departing from it." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 409, comment b (1965). The characterization of phy-
sicians as independent contractors has had, in light of the defense's general erosion as a 
defense in other contexts, a surprising vitality. For an example of a case in which a great 
many factors suggested an agency relationship that might easily have overcome an inde-
pendent contractor defense, but did not, see Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 14 
S.E.2d 643 (1941). For an interesting and readable economic explanation of the relation-
ship between physicians and hospitals, see Harris, The Internal Organization of Hospi-
tals: Same Economic Implications, 8 BELL J. OF EcoN. 467 (1977). 
10. See, e.g., Robinson v. Crotwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911); Adams v. Boyce, 
37 Cal. App. 2d 541, 99 P.2d 1044, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 694 (1940); Vanaman v. Milford 
Memorial Hasp., 272 A.2d 718 (Del. 1970); Black v. Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 109, 117 S.E. 
103 (1923); Hoke v. Harrisburg Hasp., 281 Ill. App. 247 (1935); Pikeville Methodist 
Hasp. v. Donahoo, 221 Ky. 538, 299 S.W. 159 (1927); Messina v. Societe Franc;aise De 
Bienfaissance, 170 So. 801, 806-07 (La. Ct. App. 1936) (Janvier, J., concurring); 
Hamburger v. Cornell Univ., 204 A.D. 664, 199 N.Y.S. 369 (1923), aff'd, 240 N.Y. 328, 
148 N.E. 539 (1925); Van Cleave v. lrby, 204 Okla. 689, 233 P.2d 963 (1951); Kuglich v. 
Fowle, 185 Wis. 124, 200 N.W. 648 (1924). 
1986] WHEN DOCTRINES COLLIDE 89 
have a duty to speak up under certain circumstances. If a nurse 
fails to do so, the hospital is liable under the principles of re-
spondeat superior. One thesis of this Article is that respondeat 
superior principles are appropriate to speaking up cases, but 
courts applying them have developed a needless and confusing 
array of particularized duties to impose on nurses. These duties 
are too ambiguous to be useful in guiding decisions about either 
liability or nursing behavior. 
Recent judicial and academic writing, particularly since the 
1965 case of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hos-
pital, 11 has suggested a third approach12 to the analysis of 
speaking up cases: hospitals can be liable for physicians' errors 
because of corporate negligence, the violation of a direct medi-
cal, as opposed to nursing, responsibility to patients.13 A second 
thesis of this Article is that corporate negligence, however useful 
in other contexts, is largely inapposite to the speaking up situa-
tion: it compels an analysis requiring fault by the hospital as an 
entity when none is present.14 Because the corporate negligence 
11. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); see 
infra text accompanying notes 25-45. 
12. Some courts suggest what appears to be a fourth approach: a hospital can be 
liable for a physician's negligence only if the hospital knew or should have known that 
the negligence would take place. See Heddinger v. Ashford Memorial Community Hosp., 
734 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1984); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 414, 227 N.E.2d 296, 
299, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373, 377-78 (1967); Hendrickson v. Hodkin, 276 N.Y. 252, 257-59, 11 
N.E.2d 899, 902 (1937); see also Alden v. Providence Hosp., 382 F.2d 163, 167-68 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967) (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Slawkowski, Do the 
Courts Understand the Realities of Hospital Practices?, 22 ST. LouiS UL.J. 452, 468 
(1978). This approach does not really apply to the speaking up context. When maltreat-
ment by a physician can be anticipated, it usually will be because past history suggests 
that the physician is generally incompetent. If past history is the problem, the case is not 
one of liability for not speaking up, as I define it; rather, the liability is for negligently 
retaining a physician on the staff and continuing to allow the physician the privilege of 
admitting and treating patients. See infra text accompanying notes 16-23. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 15-67. 
14. One justifiably may ask why, if the corporate negligence doctrine is so inappro-
priate in speaking up cases, courts use it at all. One answer is that "corporate negli-
gence" has received an immense amount of attention by commentators and courts, and 
seems to have swept the field of hospital liability in almost the same way that strict 
products liability swept the field of tort litigation in the mid-1960s. See PROSSER & KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 97, at 690 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) (The onset of strict 
products liability "was the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an estab-
lished rule in the entire history of the law of torts.") [hereinafter cited as PRossER & 
KEEToN]; see also Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966). Courts 
are not immune to legal fads, like "corporate negligence," even if they are not well 
thought out. A second answer is that corporate negligence seems to have received at least 
90 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
approach to speaking up cases seems to be both seriously flawed 
and growing in significance, the Article discusses it first and in 
some detail. The Article next discusses cases relying on the re-
spondeat superior theory, and applies a cost-benefit analysis to 
speaking up cases based on the Learned Hand formula for negli-
gence. The Article concludes that courts should use the respon-
deat superior theory, but should not define duties at all; instead, 
courts should use expert testimony to establish a standard of 
care. The standard would show whether in a given situation a 
reasonable, prudent nurse would have spoken up about a physi-
cian's negligence. Simple though this conclusion may appear, 
most courts have not been able to reach it. 
II. CoRPORATE NEGLIGENCE 
Corporate negligence theory treats the hospital as an entity 
and focuses on some administrative or managerial failing. Negli-
gence is predicated nominally on the breach of a duty owed di-
rectly to patients, 115 typically described as a duty to monitor 
quality, review treatment, or supervise the care delivered by pri-
vate physicians.16 The most common application of the corpo-
rate negligence theory is to a hospital that has failed to investi-
part of its impetus from the doctrine of charitable immunity. When charitable hospitals 
were immune from suit for the negligence of their employees, they still were "corporately 
liable" for the negligent hiring and retention of employees. See Southwick, The Hospi-
tal's New Responsibility, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 146, 151-54 (1968). These earlier doc-
trines, perhaps developed to circumvent charitable immunity, have a tendency to survive 
even in cases in which they are no longer needed. 
15. See Fridena v. Evans, 127 Ariz. 516, 519, 622 P.2d 463, 465-66 (1980) (en bane); 
Holton v. Resurrection Hosp., 88 Ill. App. 3d 655, 659, 410 N.E.2d 969, 973 (1980); Bost 
v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 647, 262 S.E.2d 391, 396 (1980); Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash. 
2d 226, 231-32, 677 P.2d 166, 169-70 (1984). See generally 1 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, 
supra note 2, ll 16.09, at 16-48, 16-49. 
16. See Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 80-81, 500 P.2d 335, 340-41 (1972); 
Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 345-47, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 164-65 
(1982); Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 716-17, 399 N.E.2d 198, 204-05 
(1979); Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 645-47, 262 S.E.2d 391, 395-96 (1980); Pedroza v. 
Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d 226, 229-32, 677 P.2d 166, 168-70 (1984); 1 D. LouiSELL & H. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 2, ll 16.09, at 16-50; Lisko, Hospital Liability Under Theories of Re-
spondeat Superior and Corporate Negligence, 47 UMKC L. REv. 171, 181 (1978); Com-
ment, The Hospital's Responsibility for its Medical Staff: Prospects for Corporate 
Negligence in California, 8 PAC. L.J. 141, 142 (1977); Note, Hospital Corporate Liability: 
An Effective Solution to Controlling Private Physician Incompetence?, 32 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 342, 360 (1979); Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Respon-
sibility for Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REv. 385, 411-16 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship]. 
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gate the credentials of physicians before granting them the 
privilege of admitting and treating patients. Liability in this sit-
uation is straightforward because the hospital's failing is admin-
istrative or corporate. It is, after all, the hospital's board of di-
rectors that ultimately must approve the extension of privileges 
to a physician.17 Commonly, courts apply the corporate negli-
gence doctrine in egregious situations: where a patient has been 
harmed by a physician who was removed from the staff of one or 
more other hospitals for incompetence/8 or who has been sued 
frequently for the same sort of mistake on other patients, 19 or 
who has lied about his credentials.2° Courts understandably have 
had little trouble holding hospitals responsible for not undertak-
ing reasonable inquiries before granting privileges to such 
physicians. 
A more difficult situation for the hospital, if not the courts, 
occurs when the hospital's administrators are aware or should be 
aware of a physician's incompetence after he has become a mem-
ber of the hospital staff. Here again, courts have understandably 
found a duty to use reasonable care in the continuing retention 
of physicians on the staff, however reasonable their initial ap-
pointment may have been. Some cases have involved physicians 
17. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL 
FOR HosPITALS, 1986, standard 10.4.2.1, at 109 (1985) ("Delineated clinical privileges are 
granted in accordance with the governing body and the medical staff bylaws, rules and 
regulations, and policies and are subject to approval by the governing body.") [hereinaf-
ter cited as JOINT CoMMISSION]. See also standard 10.5.8 at 114, which specifies that the 
"governing body is responsible for the final decision, based on medical staff recommen-
dations, regarding" renewal of physicians' privileges. Describing ultimate authority as in 
the hands of the hospital's governing board is perhaps too facile. Medical staff commit-
tees, composed of independent physicians, make the important recommendations about 
granting privileges to the governing board. The board often simply rubber-stamps the 
recommendations. The picture is further complicated by the fact that staff physicians 
are at times also members of the governing board. See, e.g., Fridena v. Evans, 127 Ariz. 
516, 519, 622 P.2d 463, 466 (1980) (en bane); Ludlam, Physician-Hospital Relations: The 
Role of Staff Privileges, 35 LAw & CoNTI:MP. PROBS. 879, 880-82 (1970); Perdue, Direct 
Corporate Liability of Hospitals: A Modern Day Legal Concept of Liability for Injury 
Occurring in the Modern Day Hospital, 24 S. TEx. L.J. 773, 776-83 (1983). 
18. Accord Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hasp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 717-18, 301 
N.W.2d 156, 161 (1981) (physician's privileges to perform his specialty were terminated 
at his former hospital); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 414, 227 N.E.2d 296, 299, 
280 N.Y.S.2d 373, 377 (1967) (same). 
19. Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972). 
20. See Hendrickson v. Hodkin, 276 N.Y. 252, 11 N.E.2d 899 (1937) (layperson 
claimed to have a cure for cancer); Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 
2d 708, 713-20, 301 N.W.2d 156, 159-62 (1981). 
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with serious alcohol or drug abuse problems that become well-
known to the hospital administrator.21 Other cases have involved 
physicians who have been denied permission to perform a par-
ticular procedure elsewhere, but were allowed by the defendant 
hospital to use the procedure, with injurious consequences.22 
Similarly, a hospital may be liable for continuing to allow a staff 
doctor to have. privileges when the hospital knows about several 
malpractice suits against the doctor.23 
The negligent granting and retaining of privileges for physi-
cians are both classified appropriately as corporate failings. Im-
posing corporate negligence liability is, however, least appropri-
ate in speaking up cases when the hospital administration has 
no reason to believe that a physician is generally incompetent. 
Corporate liability for not monitoring quality in this situation is 
either a euphemism or an ill-fitting replacement for respondeat 
superior liability because the hospital's administration is not re-
ally at fault: there is no actual negligence by the administration, 
no failure to issue or enforce rules or procedures.24 
The case credited25 with developing the corporate negli-
gence theory in the speaking up context is Darling v. Charleston 
Community Memorial Hospital,26 decided by the Illinois Su-
21. See, e.g., Penn Tanker Co. v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Tex. 1970); 
Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976) (en bane) 
(complaint concerning a physician's alcoholic state at the time of an operation). 
22. See, e.g., Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 
373 (1967). 
23. See Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972); Elanl v. Col-
lege Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982). 
24. Commentator Arthur Southwick notes that courts frequently confuse the doc-
trines of corporate negligence and respondeat superior. A SoUTHWICK, THE LAw OF Hos-
PITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 358-59, 422-23 (1978); Southwick, Hospital Lia-
bility: Two Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J. LEG. MEn. 1, 45-46 (1983). Southwick 
argues that a blurring of the doctrines makes little practical difference. I argue that it 
does make a difference in the speaking up case because it allows courts to set arbitrary 
"duties" and can lead to confusion over who may testify at a trial. 
25. See Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 345, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 
164 (1982); Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 646, 262 S.E.2d 391, 396 (1980); Pedroza v. 
Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d 226, 229, 677 P.2d 166, 168 (1984); Lisko, supra note 16, at 181; 
Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Re-
lationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 429, 443 (1973); Note, Hospital 
Corporate Liability, supra note 16, at 360. 
26. 33 ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). For 
several years, there was confusion about whether the physician in the case was or was 
not an employee of the hospital. Had he been an employee, of course, the case against 
the hospital would have been a simple one of respondeat superior for the physician's 
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preme Court in 1965. The court clung doggedly to the idea of an 
administrative failing when none needed to be found; conse-
quently, the opinion contains a series of untenable assertions 
that have misled both courts and commentators. In Darling, a 
college football player broke his leg and his treating physician 
put it in a cast. While the boy remained in the hospital, his toes 
gradually swelled, grew darker in color, became cold, and lost 
feeling. As these symptoms worsened, the attending physician 
first notched the cast near the toes, then cut a portion of the 
cast away. Finally, on the fourth day after the cast was applied, 
he removed the cast from a gangrenous leg that had to be ampu-
tated below the knee. The hospital nurses had observed the 
boy's symptoms but alerted only the treating physician, whose 
response had been ineffective. 
The boy's parents sued the hospital, and the jury returned a 
verdict in their favor. The Illinois Supreme Court decided that 
the jury's verdict could be upheld on either of two grounds: first, 
that the hospital did not employ enough nurses to monitor and 
report on the patient's condition; or second, that the hospital 
failed to review the treatment or require a consultation.27 The 
first ground is an assertion of direct corporate liability: the hos-
pital as an institution failed to employ enough nurses to do an 
adequate job of caring for patients. This is an odd rationale for 
upholding the verdict. Testimony showed that the nurses were 
negligence and the opinion would have been wholly unremarkable. At least three courts 
declared that the Darling opinion was of no relevance to corporate liability in the speak-
ing up situation because the physician in Darling was in fact an employee. See Collins v. 
Westlake Community Hosp., 12 Ill. App. 3d 847, 299 N.E.2d 326, rev'd on other grounds, 
57 Ill. 2d 388, 312 N.E.2d 614 (1974); Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. 
App. 2d 461, 235 N.E.2d 671 (1968); Hull v. North Valley Hosp., 159 Mont. 375, 498 P.2d 
136 (1972). One commentator asserted that the opinion was ambiguous on the point. See 
Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship, supra note 16, at 413. Another com-
mentator stated that the opinion was "far from clear." Slawkowski, Do the Courts Un-
derstand the Realities of Hospital Practices?, 22 ST. LoUis U.L.J. 452, 455 (1978). An 
authoritative commentator found, however, by reading the hospital's petition for rehear-
ing in the case, that the physician had not been an employee. See A. SouTHWICK, supra 
note 24, at 415 n.168 (1978). A careful reading of the hospital's initial brief in the case 
confirms that finding: 
A hospital is not liable for any negligence . . . on the part of a physician or 
surgeon who practices his profession as an independent agent . . • ; where a 
patient employs a physician or surgeon not in the employ of the hospital, the 
hospital is not liable for his negligence. 
Annot., 14 A.L.R.3n 86(), 862 (1967). 
27. Darling, 33 Ill. 2d at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258. 
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aware of the changing condition of the boy's toes and even called 
the treating physician for re-examination. 28 In short, there 
plainly were enough nurses on the staff to monitor and report 
the patient's condition because they did exactly that. 
The second ground was also expressed in terms of institu-
tional responsibility, one to "review treatment," suggesting that 
the hospital administration should have implemented routine re-
views of all physicians' treatments while the treatments were 
ongoing. This would be a revolutionary rule if the court meant it 
literally. Although hospitals do review treatments once they are 
completed in order to control quality,29 the Darling court could 
not have been addressing after-the-fact reviews. The failure of a 
hospital to conduct an after-the-fact review only can be a cause_ 
of a later injury, when the hospital knows of the physician's in-
competence and can act to cancel hospital privileges. It cannot 
be a cause of an injury that took place before the review was to 
be conducted. Nor does the opinion suggest any other instances 
of the physician's incompetence that might have put the hospi-
tal on notice. The Darling court's requirement that the hospital 
review treatment must therefore be a requirement for a review 
while treatment is still underway. But a requirement for routine 
reviews of on-going treatments would add intolerably to medical 
care costs. A hospital would have to hire enough physicians to 
double check every private physician's decisions, nearly doubling 
the amount that patients would pay for physicians' services. 
28. See Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial .Hosp., 50 ill. App. 2d 253, 
270-72, 200 N.E.2d 149, 159-60 (1964), aff'd, 33 ill. 2d 326, 329, 211 N.E.2d 253, 256 
(1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). 
29. The accreditation standards for hospitals call for the medical staff to perform 
quality assurance checks. See JOINT CoMMISSION, supra note 17. The standards refer to 
the "monitoring and evaluation of the quality and appropriateness of patient care." I d. 
standard 10.6, at 114. But it is clear that the monitoring referred to is periodic, after-the-
fact monitoring. See, e.g., standard 10.6.1.1.3.1, at 114 ("routine collection of informa-
tion"); standard 10.6.1.1.3.2, at 115 ("periodic assessment of this information"); standard 
10.6.1.2.1, at 115 ("[s]urgical case review is performed monthly"); standard 10.6.1.4.1, at 
116 ("[t]he quality of medical records is reviewed at least quarterly"); standard 
10.6.1.5.1, at 117 ("The medical staff performs blood usage review at least quarterly."). 
The standards also contain a summary section for quality assurance procedures for 
the hospital overall, including those undertaken by the ani!sthesia services, the dietetic 
services, the emergency services, the nursing services, etc. See id. standard 17, "Quality 
Assurance," at 205-08. Again, these hospital-wide standards refer to after-the-fact re-
views. See, e.g., standard 17.2.1.1.1, at 206 (requiring monitoring and evaluating the 
quality of patient care through "monthly meetings of clinical departments"). 
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Further, if failure to effect routine reviews rendered a hospi-
tal negligent, then hospitals almost always would be liable for 
any malpractice committed by physicians within their walls. 
This conclusion follows from the fact that a review of physicians' 
treatments, if done properly, would catch and correct most er-
rors. The hospital's failure to make a careful review of on-going 
treatments would therefore be a direct cause of a patient's harm. 
A requirement that hospitals provide automatic review of all 
cases thus would impose a kind of strict liability on hospitals,30 a 
rule rejected by most courts, including those in Darling's own 
lliinois.31 
The best argument that Darling imposed an obligation on 
hospitals as corporate entities is the court's reference to consul-
tations. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant hospital should 
have required the physician to obtain a consultation, "particu-
larly after complications had developed."32 This allegation was 
reflected in a jury instruction approved by the illinois Supreme 
Court. 33 Commentators have since identified Darling with a re-
quirement for hospitals to establish rules and procedures for 
consultation. 34 
Establishing rules and procedures sounds like an institu-
tionalized or corporate responsibility that is appropriate in the 
speaking up context. Part of speaking up is calling for consulta-
tion when it is needed. But as a branch of corporate negligence, 
requiring consultations adds little to the analysis of these cases. 
First, if a hospital procedure directs physicians to seek con-
30. Commentators have argued for the imposition of strict liability on hospitals. 
See Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship, supra note 16; Note, supra note 
16; Note, Risk Administration in the Marketplace: A Reappraisal of the Independent 
Contractor Rule, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1973) (arguing that those hiring independent 
contractors of any type should be jointly liable with the contractor for the contractor's 
negligence). 
31. 1 8. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, supra note 3, § 3:27, at 93-94 (Supp. 1986); see 
Pickle v. Curns, 106 Til. App. 3d 734, 739, 435 N.E.2d 877, 881-82 (1982); Hull v. North 
Valley Hosp., 159 Mont. 375, 498 P.2d 136 (1972); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 
227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967); Van Cleave v. lrby, 204 Okla. 689, 233 P.2d 963 
(1951). See generally Note, supra note 16. 
32. Darling, 33 Til. 2d at 329, 211 N.E.2d at 256. 
33. Id. at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258. 
34. 1 8. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, supra note 3, § 3:29, at 233 (1980); Koskoff & 
Nadeau, Hospital Liability: The Emerging Standard of Care, 48 CONN. BAR J. 305, 321-
23 (1974). 
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sultation, it adds nothing to the existing standards of medical 
practice. In the exercise of reasonable care, physicians already 
must call in consultative assistance anytime they are uncertain 
how to proceed.315 Whether a hospital adopts procedures di-
recting a physican to seek consultation cannot add to a physi-
cian's liability or incentives in this regard. Second, a line of cases 
discussed below36 has asserted for years that nurses must speak 
up in certain circumstances, and the cases have never relied on 
the presence or absence of hospital procedures that called for 
speaking up. As with physicians, if reasonable nurses already 
have a duty to request consultative help from residents or other 
physicians, the hospital's adoption of procedures to that effect 
would not change the nurses' liability. 
Third, it hardly makes sense to hold a hospital liable for the 
failure to adopt procedures that nurses already would be ex-
pected to follow as a matter of law and good nursing practice. If 
a nurse breaches those professional standards, the hospital as 
employer is liable on a respondeat superior theory. It only dis-
torts the analysis to take this straightforward approach and re-
casts it in the form of corporate negligence·for not adopting pro-
cedures requiring nurses to ask for consultation. Fourth, 
procedures requiring nurses to speak up or to call for consulta-
tion, cannot answer the central question of these cases: when 
must a nurse speak up, and when is it acceptable not to? This 
question vexes even those courts that do apply a simple respon-
deat superior approach to speaking up cases.37 
The Darling decision is best understood as finding liability 
not for a new theory that the hospital failed to institute review 
procedures or monitor quality, but for the prosaic theory that 
nurses negligently failed to speak up about a physician's mal-
treatment. Early commentary on Darling seemed to accept the 
case as unexceptional on this point.38 By the 1970s, however, 
35. A HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAw 49-52 (2d ed. 1978); 1 S. PEGALIS & H. 
WACHSMAN, supra note 3, § 2:14 (1980). 
36. See infra text accompanying notes 68-134. 
37. Id. 
38. One commentator in the Illinois Bar Journal of 1966, a year after Darling, 
concluded that Darling imposed duties on hospitals to be informed about medical proce-
dures, to review physicians' treatment, and to require consultations if needed-but the 
article treated none of these as especially significant. See Recent Decisions, Hospi-
tals-Evidence-Charities-Hospital Held Liable for Negligent Discharge of Medical 
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commentators began to say that the Darling court's focus on 
corporate negligence represented a significant departure from 
earlier law.39 Oddly, some of the same commentators also have 
Duties, 54 ILL. B.J. 743 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Recent Decisions, Hospitals]. The 
bulk of this article discusses the court's admission into evidence of the hospital's own 
procedures and bylaws to set the standard of care. Another scholarly article in 1970 very 
briefly mentioned the possibility that Darling had some import for corporate negligence. 
See Ludlam, supra note 17, at 884. 
Between 1965 and 1966, at least seven student notes discussing Darling appeared in 
the literature, all but one focusing on the Illinois Supreme Court's allowance of a medical 
treatise as evidence. Note, Evidence-Expert Witness-Use of Authoritative Treatises 
on Cross-Examination, 15 DEPAUL L. REv. 492 (1966); Comment, Torts-Hospital's Lia-
bility-Standard of Care, 43 N.C.L. REv. 469 (1965); Recent Decisions, Evi-
dence-Learned Treatises-Admissible for Use in Cross-Examining Expert to Test 
Knowledge, 41 NoTRE DAME LAw. 607 (1966); Note, Evidence-Expert Medical Witness 
May be Cross-Examined On the Content of Medical Texts Not Relied Upon For His 
Opinion, 17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 566 (1966); Recent Decisions, Evidence-Authoritative 
Treatises Can Be Used in Cross-Examination of an Expert Witness, 1966 U. ILL. L.R 
225; Recent Developments, Evidence-Expe-rt Witnesses-Medical Treatises Upon 
Which Expert Witness Has Not Expressly Relied May Be Used in Cross-Examining 
Him, 11 VILL. L. REv. 637 (1966); Case Comments, Evidence-Use of Learned Treatises 
in Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses, 68 W.VA. L. REv. 329 (1966). 
Only the North Carolina Law Review comment discussed corporate liability and the 
standard of care for hospitals. Even this comment, however, saw Darling as dealing with 
the hospital administrator's liability for employing incompetent physicians, an already 
well-established rule. See Comment, Torts-Hospital's Liability-Standard of Care, 43 
N.C.L. REV. 469, 474 (1965); cases cited infra note 43. 
Among the few articles that did find Darling to be of significance to corporate liabil-
ity were Hanson & Stromberg, supra note 2, at 11-14 (three pages out of thirty-four) and 
Southwick, supra note 14. 
Most commentators at first, then, did not see Darling as especially noteworthy. Per-
haps that was partly due to the belief that the physician in the case was actually a hospi-
tal employee. See supra note 25. Certainly the case seems uncontroversially decided. A 
simple broken bone led to the amputation of a young man's leg while nurses who could 
have done something did nothing over a period of days. But the court relied on the 
language of corporate negligence, not simply on nursing negligence. By 1972, the sharp 
increase in medical malpractice litigation may have led commentators to seize too 
quickly on that language, missing the opportunity to analyze the speaking up fact pat-
tern separately. For a report discussing the sharp increase in medical malpractice litiga-
tion, see DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S 
CoMMISSION oN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 5 (1973). 
39. See 1 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, " 16.01, at 16-5, " 16.09, at 16-
48 to 16-50; Goldberg, supra note 9; Hedgepeth, Darling Revisited, 46 J. AHA 58 
(1972); Lisko, supra note 16, at 181; Perdue, supra note 17, at 788; Rapp, Darling and 
Its Progeny: A Radical Approach Toward Hospital Liability, 60 ILL. B.J. 883 (1972); 
Southwick, supra note 25, at 443-46; Spero, Hospital Liability: Vicarious and Direct 
Corporate Responsibility for Acts of Professional Negligence Committed in a Hospital, 
TRIAL, July 1979, at 25; Note, Independent Duty of a Hospital to Prevent Physicians' 
Malpractice, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 953, 960-61 (1973); Note, supra note 16, at 360; Comment, 
Hospital Liability for the Negligence of Physicians: Some Needed Legal Sutures, 26 U. 
FLA. L. REV. 844, 851 (1974). 
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maintained that Darling has had only a minor effect on hospital 
liability, confined to rare cases of a physician's gross negligence40 
or outrageously poor treatment.41 There seems to be confusion, 
then, over whether Darling represents a major new theory of 
hospital liability widely cited by other courts or simply reflects a 
court's reaction to very rare and shocking circumstances, to be 
followed only in equally rare circumstances. What has actually 
happened is this. The Darling court's approach to institutional 
or corporate negligence has been followed principally in cases of 
a hospital administration's failure to screen physicians' creden-
tials or terminate their staff privileges.42 Corporate negligence in 
these cases, though, always has been the rule.43 The Darling 
court's inarticulate holding that the hospital was liable for its 
nurses' negligence has also been followed-but in cases in which 
respondeat superior was applied or should have been applied.44 
In sum, for speaking up cases, Darling's language is focused 
inappropriately on the hospital as an entity because the issue is 
one of individual nursing, not corporate, negligence.45 Its hold-
ing, however, was correct. 
40. See 1 D. LouiSELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 1l 16.09, at 16-55. 
41. See Lisko, supra note 16, at 183-84. 
42. See Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship, supra note 16, at 415-16. 
43. See, e.g., Iterman v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 318, 15 N.E.2d 365, 369-70 (1938); 
Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 634, 14 S.E.2d 643, 647 (1941); Glavin v. Rhode 
Island Hosp., 12 R.I. 411, 424 (1879); see also supra note. 9 (discussion of a hotel's liabil-
ity). Perhaps what Darling helped to change was not the rule, but courts' willingness to 
use it as more than just a hollow dictum. 
44. See infra text accompanying notes 68-134. To the extent that Darling dealt 
with shocking, outrageous conduct by a physician, the case fits in neatly with the respon-
deat superior cases that speak of "obvious" negligence. See infra text accompanying 
notes 77-106. 
45. 1 S. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, supra note 3, § 3:29. As this Article makes clear, 
I disagree with most other commentators on Darling's significance to the corporate negli-
gence doctrine. Arthur Southwick, for example, a frequent commentator on matters of 
hospital liability, first observed in 1968 that Darling "looks like an extension of the idea 
of corporate negligence." Southwick, supra note 14, at 161. Southwick first identified the 
corporate negligence doctrine as consisting of duties to use reasonable care in (1) main-
taining buildings and grounds, (2) providing medical equipment and devices, and (3) 
selecting and retaining personnel. Id. at 152-54. He then concluded that Darling ex-
tended corporate negligence because the case was based not on respondeat superior, but 
on "violation of direct duties that [the hospital] owes to the patient." Id. at 161. 
By 1973, Southwick was describing Darling as a "landmark case" that helped to 
eliminate any distinctions between respondeat superior and corporate negligence. See 
Southwick, supra note 25, at 443, 452-53. He expanded on these views in a 1978 book, A. 
SoUTHWICK, supra note 24. In The Law of Hospital he argued that Darling does not 
require a hospital to review on-going medical cases, but does require an institutional 
response: "The [hospital] administration ... is now called upon to stimulate the medi-
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If Darling were an isolated case in this regard, the diver-
gence between its broad language and rather narrow holding 
would matter little. The case and the corporate negligence doc-
trine have, however, continued to receive frequent attention. 
When that attention comes in a speaking up case, confusion fol-
lows. For example, in Bost v. Riley,46 the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals considered whether to adopt the doctrine of corpo-
rate negligence. The plaintiff's intestate had a bicycle accident 
in which he injured the left side of his body. He was admitted to 
the defendant hospital's emergency room and was under the 
care of several physicians who were not hospital employees. His 
treatment involved several operations over the course of a 
month. Following his death in the hospital, the plaintiffs sued 
both the physicians and the hospital, alleging that the latter was 
negligent in granting privileges to the physicians, in failing to 
monitor adequately their care, and in failing to monitor ade-
quately the decedent's condition or require the physicians to 
keep better progress notes.47 
The estate charged the hospital with both corporate negli-
gence and respondeat superior liability. The trial court directed 
cal staff of the institution to organize a means of reviewing the professional qualifications 
and performance of each individual staff physician." Id. at 411; see also Hanson & 
Stromberg, supra note 2, at 13 ("a hospital administration must stimulate its medical 
staff to establish procedures for consultation"). I argue that Darling does not require an 
institutional response to speaking up cases at all, other than that a hospital must make 
clear to employees that if something is going wrong, they should not hesitate to see that 
matters are set aright. Far from supporting the notion of corporate negligence, this type 
of response is absolutely indistinguishable from the institutional response that respon-
deat superior would stimulate. Southwick's interpretation is one that is a correct state-
ment of law-hospitals are obliged to relieve incompetent physicians of their privi-
leges-but it does not stem, in my view, from the holding of Darling. 
Interestingly, the only commentators who view Darling and similar cases as impos-
ing serious obligations on hospital employees-not just on hospital administrators-are 
either physicians, nurses, or commentators writing for a nursing audience. See 1 S. 
PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, supra note 3, § 3:29 (Wachsman has both an M.D. and a J.D. 
degree); Greenlaw, Reporting Incompetent Colleagues, 1 NuRSING LAw & ETHICS 4 
(1980); Katz, Reporting and Review of Patient Care: The Nurse's Responsibility, 11 
LAw, MEDICINE, & HEALTH CARE 76 (1983); SPRINGHOUSE CoRPORATION BooK DMSION, 
PRACTICES 541-47 (Nurse's Reference Library 1984); see also Lunsford v. Board of Nurse 
Examiners, 648 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (a nurse's license was suspended for not 
speaking up). 
46. 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391 (1980). Bost is discussed at length in Note, 
Tort Law-Corporate Negligence of Hospitals and the Duty to Monitor and Oversee 
Medical Treatment-Bast v. Riley, 17 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 309 (1981). 
47. Bost, 44 N. C. App. at 640-41, 262 S.E.2d at 393. 
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a verdict for the hospital, which the court of appeals affirmed. 
The appellate court dismissed the respondeat superior theory 
because the physicians were not acting as "employees, agents, or 
servants"48 of the hospital. The court failed to mention the pos-
sibility of respondeat superior liability for the nurses' or other 
employees' negligence, leaving only corporate negligence as a ba-
sis for liability. As a matter of simple logic, the court's omission 
is faulty legal reasoning. The Bast decision therefore is flawed 
for not addressing the hospital's respondeat superior liability for 
the nurses' negligence in failing to speak up. The court did rely, 
however, on the corporate negligence theory. 
In an effort to find authority for its reliance, the court dis-
cussed the theory at length, citing six law review commentaries 
and discussing earlier North Carolina cases that "implicitly" had 
adopted the corporate negligence theory. The court concluded 
that it was appropriate for it to adopt the theory. Having 
adopted it, however, the court held that the plaintiff's case 
failed on a matter of proof. There was no evidence that the vic-
tim would not have suffered injury had the hospital enforced its 
procedure requiring physicians to keep adequate progress 
notes. 49 Therefore, a directed verdict was appropriate. 
It is accurate in some respects to label the hospital's failure 
to enforce its record-keeping requirements as corporate negli-
gence. Enforcing hospital rules at least sounds like an adminis-
trative or corporate responsibility. But the plaintiff had also al-
leged the hospital's failure to monitor quality in general, 
presumably referring to the failure to catch the physician's 
treatment errors. The court simply took no notice of this allega-
tion at all. Although it is not clear why the court did not con-
sider the allegation, a reasonable guess is that the plaintiff failed 
to point to any specific acts of nursing negligence. If corporate 
negligence for not monitoring quality meant anything, the court 
should have addressed the issue even without the plaintiff's alle-
gation of specific incidents. That the court did not address the 
issue suggests that monitoring quality in a speaking up case 
means nothing if specific employee negligence cannot be found. 
If specific negligence can be found, however, the simplest way to 
handle the case is to hold the hospital vicariously liable under 
48. Id. at 645, 262 S.E.2d at 395. 
49. Id. at 648, 262 S.E.2d at 397. 
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respondeat superior-not to adopt the theory of corporate negli-
gence. In all, the Bost court's reliance on corporate negligence 
only muddied its analysis and offered nothing that could not 
have been handled on the basis of respondeat superior. 
The Washington Court of Appeals in Alexander v. Gonser/'0 
recently exhibited a similar confusion by assuming that corpo-
rate negligence extends to speaking up cases. A patient in the 
late stages of pregnancy had an automobile accident that forced 
her abdomen against the car's steering wheel. Her obstetrician 
admitted her to the hospital and examined her there. He gave 
orders for fetal heart monitoring and went home. The nurse per-
forming the monitoring called the obstetrician at home to report 
that the fetal heartbeat was "equivocal," and that the patient 
still complained of numbness. When he nevertheless directed 
the nurse to discharge the patient, the nurse "voiced her concern 
with the test results."111 The obstetrician stood by his decision to 
discharge the patient, with instructions for her to return the 
next day. Nothing was said to the patient about the test results. 
The patient returned the next morning. Renewed monitor-
ing showed fetal distress, and a caesarean delivery resulted in a 
partially asphyxiated infant with permanent brain damage. The 
patient sued the hospital on several theories that were not 
clearly articulated by the court, but one of the theories was ex-
pressly identified as corporate negligence.112 
The court observed at the outset that "[c]orporate negli-
gence has been extended to include placing a duty on the hospi-
tal to 'intervene in the treatment of its patients if there is obvi-
ous negligence.' "118 It then cited a number of cases from other 
jurisdictions114 for the proposition that these jurisdictions found 
50. 42 Wash. App. 234, 711 P.2d 347 (1985). 
51. Id. at 236, 711 P.2d at 349. 
52. Id. at 239-40, 711 P.2d at 349. Another theory was that she did not give her 
informed consent to the hospital's treatment or lack of treatment because she was not 
told of the test results. The court held that any duty to inform her of test results rested 
with her physician, not the hospital, on the grounds that a contrary conclusion would 
interfere with the doctor-patient relationship. !d. at 239, 711 P.2d at 350-51. 
53. Id. at 240, 711 P.2d at 351 (quoting Schoening v. Grays Harbor Community 
Hosp., 40 Wash. App. 331, 335, 698 P.2d 593, 596 (1985)). 
54. Fridena v. Evans, 127 Ariz. 516, 622 P.2d 463 (1980) (en bane); Poor Sisters of 
St. Francis v. Catron, 435 N.E.2d 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 
N.Y.2d 255, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440, 239 N.E.2d 368 (1968); Utter v. United Hosp. Center, 160 
W. Va. 703, 236 S.E.2d 213 (1977). 
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hospitals liable when employees failed to speak up. None of the 
cases cited by the court, however, was based on the doctrine of 
corporate negligence; they were all handled as simple cases of 
respondeat superior liability. 
The patient in Alexander introduced an affidavit by a "Dr. 
Jones, who specialized in psychology rather than obstetrics"55 in 
support of her corporate negligence claim. The court observed 
that Dr. Jones "was not knowledgeable as to the standard of 
care for obstetricians in Washington."56 On the basis of this affi-
davit, the trial court found that the patient had shown a breach 
of the hospital's duty to monitor her physician, but had not 
shown that the breach caused the "clinical situation that oc-
curred on" the day she was injured. 57 The court of appeals ac-
cepted those findings, but should not have because they ad-
dressed the wrong question. The issue was not whether the 
nurses' failure to speak up caused the fetal distress on the day 
the patient was admitted. The proper question was whether the 
infant's condition at birth the next day would have been better 
if the nurses had spoken up by seeking consultation on the day 
of admission. To be sure, the patient did not help her cause or 
the court by having a psychologist instead of a nurse prepare an 
affidavit. Although it is possible that a doctor specializing in 
psychology would be familiar with the nursing standard of care, 
the court's principal confusion was its reference to the doctor's 
lack of familiarity with an obstetrician's standard of care-a 
standard not directly relevant to the nurses involved, who, after 
all, bear the obligation to speak up. 
Inexplicably, the patient also introduced two depositions in 
which doctors, presumably physicians, stated that the nurses 
conformed to the accepted standard of care in conferring with 
the obstetrician. This evidence conflicted with the trial court's 
finding that the hospital improperly monitored the physician's 
care. The fact that some evidence conflicts with an ultimate 
finding is not noteworthy in itself. What is noteworthy is that 
neither the trial nor the appellate court sensed the contradic-
tion: how can a hospital fail to fulfill its obligation to monitor a 
physician when its employees conformed to the accepted stan-
55. Alexander, 42 Wash. App. at 241, 711 P.2d at 352. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
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dard of care? The proper resolution of the case at trial would 
have been to recognize that corporate negligence was inappropri-
ate and to grant summary judgment for the hospital because the 
patient's own evidence showed that there was no breach of the 
nurses' obligation to speak up. 
In affirming the summary judgment for the hospital, the 
court of appeals relied in part on the fact that the physician's 
"hospital privileges did not become reviewable until after [the 
patient's] treatment" had been completed.58 The court was re-
ferring to corporate negligence in its most common form: negli-
gence in granting or continuing a physician's privileges. In a 
speaking up case, however, the timing of a physician's peer re-
view is irrelevant-the only proper question is whether the 
nurses should have done more than they did. 
Like the court's opinion, the plaintiff's case also reflects 
confusion over corporate negligence. The plaintiff's expert, Dr. 
Jones, stated in regard to the alleged failings by the hospital 
that " 'unacceptable practice patterns might have been disclosed 
which would have warranted closer supervision. . . . ' "59 This 
abstract review of the situation focuses on hospital procedures in 
its reference to practice patterns. Hospital procedures are prop-
erly at issue when a hospital has failed to establish correct ones, 
but Alexander is a speaking up case in which there is no indica-
tion of a failure to adopt the proper procedures. A nurse's affida-
vit stating that a reasonable nurse would have called in a resi-
dent when the treating physician failed to do anything would 
have been far more pertinent for the plaintiff than this vague 
reference to practice patterns. 
Once again, as in the Bost case,60 a focus on nursing negli-
gence, with less attention to corporate negligence, either would 
have strengthened the plaintiff's case, or would have allowed the 
court to dispose of the case because of a lack of evidence that 
the nurses breached a standard of care. The corporate negli-
gence doctrine simply confused the issues. 
Curiously, only eight months before Alexander, the 
Washington Court of Appeals in Schoening v. Grays Harbor 
58. Id. 
59. Id. (quoting affidavit of plaintiff's medical expert). 
60. Bast, 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391. 
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Community Hospital,61 satisfactorily handled a speaking up sit-
uation under the doctrine of corporate negligence. The plaintiff 
had given birth to a child at the defendant hospital and was dis-
charged two days later. For reasons not specified in the opinion, 
her condition began to deteriorate and she returned to the hos-
pital. Under the care of her private physicians, her condition 
continued to deteriorate for seven days. She was then trans-
ferred to another hospital where she underwent various surgical 
procedures. 
She brought suit against the treating physicians and the 
first hospital for injuries during the period of deterioration. As 
part of her case against the hospital, she introduced an affidavit 
from a physician that generally asserted a failure of the hospital 
to meet "minimum medical standards of practice."62 The physi-
cian based his conclusion on 
[a] standard of care for hospitals [that] required continued 
monitoring and observation of the patient by the hospital staff, 
as well as obtaining an additional or independent evaluation of 
the patient in those instances where the care being provided by 
the attending physician is questionable and where the patient's 
condition continues to deteriorate.63 
The appellate court found that this affidavit was sufficient for 
the plaintiff to make out a jury issue on hospital negligence, and, 
accordingly, it reversed a grant of summary judgment for the 
hospital. This decision is correct: the physician stated in his affi-
davit that the hospital staff should have done something; a trial 
was necessary to determine if that assertion was correct. Nota-
bly, the doctrine of corporate negligence was just excess baggage 
in the case. It was enough that the nurses who observed the 
plaintiff's condition failed to take the steps that reasonable 
nurses would have taken; the hospital would then be liable as 
the nurses' employer. 
The court implicitly acknowledged that the corporate negli-
gence doctrine is superfluous in the speaking up context. It first 
noted that the corporate negligence doctrine was not adopted by 
the Washington Supreme Court until 1984 in Pedroza v. 
61. 40 Wash. App. 331, 698 P.2d 593 (1985). 
62. Id. at 335-36, 698 P.2d at 596. 
63. Id. 
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Bryant.64 It then stated that "[a]lthough the trial court did not 
have the benefit of Pedroza, the same reasoning is present in 
earlier cases,"65 holding that hospital staff members were negli-
gent and that the hospital was liable as their employer.66 In 
short, the advent of the corporate negligence doctrine in 
Pedroza had not changed the law applied to speaking up cases. 67 
If adoption of a doctrine like corporate negligence changes noth-
ing, then the doctrine, as I have argued, is meaningless. 
III. THE RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR CASES 
Most courts resolve speaking up cases on the basis of re-
spondeat superior without reference to the doctrine of corporate 
negligence. Nevertheless, these courts take a variety of ap-
proaches to a serious dilemma: a nurse should be able to follow a 
physician's direct order without fear of liability; at the same 
64. 101 Wash. 2d 226, 677 P.2d 166 (1984). 
65. Schoening, 40 Wash. App. at 334, 698 P.2d at 595. 
66. Id. The court cited Osborn v. Public Hasp. Dist., 80 Wash. 2d 201, 205, 492 
P.2d 1025, 1028 (1972) and Teig v. Saint Johns Hosp., 63 Wash. 2d 369, 373, 387 P.2d 
527, 530 (1963). 
67. I argue that the doctrine of corporate negligence, in speaking up cases decided 
so far, has either led to confusion or been superfluous. Partly that is because courts are 
infatuated with sweeping language about hospital duties. It is worth asking how serious 
courts are about corporate negligence by positing a speaking up case in which the doc-
trine would make a real difference from an analysis based on respondeat superior. Sup-
pose a physician decides that a patient needs one of two alternative but risky treatments, 
each of which is well accepted as customary care. The physician administers one of the 
treatments in conjunction with nurse A. The physician then later decides to administer 
the second treatment, this time in conjunction with nurse B. If giving both treatments 
together is negligent, will the hospital be liable? Plainly neither nurse would be negli-
gent, so reliance on respondeat superior liability would be unavailing. The hospital 
"knows," however, that the overall treatment is negligent because the collective knowl-
edge of its agents is imputed to the principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 268, 
272 (1958). If the corporate negligence cases really are different from the respondeat 
superior cases, a hospital should be liable in this situation. It remains to be seen if the 
case will arise. 
A second case is possible, but seems unlikely ever to arise. Suppose a hospital's ad-
ministration issues regulations that require employees to follow physicians' orders no 
matter how wrong they seem. If a nurse then follows an indisputably, obviously wrong 
order and harms a patient, the hospital could be liable. Liability would be based on 
negligent (or perhaps even intentional) issuance of ill-advised rules and procedures-a 
genuine form of corporate negligence. Interestingly, the nurse might be liable as well, if 
in fact reasonable nurses would have ignored the rules and spoken up about the physi-
cian's orders. The hospital might therefore be liable both for corporate negligence and on 
the basis of respondeat superior. The case seems too far-fetched to argue against the 
point of this Article, that hospital liability for employees' not speaking up is better han-
dled as a matter of respondeat superior, not corporate negligence. 
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time, a nurse should not follow an order that is obviously wrong 
and will very likely cause a patient harm. A clearly stated and 
easily applied rule of liability that takes care of these competing 
goals has escaped many courts so far, primarily because of the 
difficulty of determining what constitutes an obviously wrong 
order. 
Some courts avoid the issue altogether by following a firm 
rule that a nurse is never liable for following a physician's order. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court took this approach in Van 
Cleave v. Irby,68 in which the plaintiff sued both a physician and 
a hospital. The physician had directed a nurse to put a patient 
on an electric diathermy machine for twenty minutes. The nurse 
had followed these instructions and the patient was burned. The 
case against the hospital was tried on a respondeat superior the-
ory. Plaintiff argued that both the treating physician and the 
nurse were agents of the hospital and that both were negligent. 
The court concluded that the physician had been negligent, but 
was not the hospital's agent. Conversely, the court held that the 
nurse was the hospital's agent, but had not been negligent. Be-
cause she had followed the physician's order to leave the heat 
applied for twenty minutes, "[t]here [was] no evidence tending 
to establish negligence" by the nurse.69 The court did not in-
quire whether a reasonable nurse might have known that the 
heat was too great or was applied too long. Nor did the court 
acknowledge the possibility that a physician's orders could be so 
wrong that a reasonable nurse would not follow them. The court 
thus implied that a nurse could not be negligent for following 
any order, no matter how wrong it could be. 
In contrast to the Van Cleave approach, a number of courts 
have identified situations in which a nurse should not follow a 
physician's order. For example, some courts simply state, with-
out further explanation, that employees must speak up about 
physicians' obvious errors;70 or that they must obey a physician's 
orders unless they are clearly contraindicated.71 Another court 
has required that hospital employees speak up about any depar-
68. 204 Okla. 689, 233 P.2d 963 (1951). 
69. Id. at 690, 233 P.2d at 965. 
70. See infra text accompanying notes 75-90. 
71. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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ture by a physician from medical standards,72 without regard, 
presumably, to whether the departure is obvious or clear. Still 
other courts have not mentioned physicians' medical standards, 
but have implied that an employee's training is what triggers a 
requirement to speak up: if the employee does not have the 
training to know that a particular procedure is improper, then 
the employee should not have an obligation to say anything; if 
the employee is trained, however, then the employee should 
speak up.73 
These cases all rely on curious contortions of "duty" lan-
guage, contortions that can best be appreciated after reading a 
summary of a speaking up case that avoided them. Recall that a 
thesis of this Article is that a court can satisfactorily dispose of 
speaking up cases by focusing on the need for expert testimony 
for proof of employee negligence. A good example is Mundt v. 
Alta Bates Hospital,?'' a 1963 California case. A patient's treat-
ing physician had installed a catheter in the patient's leg. Over a 
period of about twenty-four hours, the patient's leg became in-
creasingly swollen, firm, and reddened. The nursing staff called 
the physician a number of times, but the physician did not see a 
need for action. The patient suffered an infiltration of fluid into 
her leg tissue, with damage sufficient to require plastic surgery. 
After a jury verdict for the hospital, the trial court ordered a 
new trial, and the court of appeals affi.rmed.76 The court found 
additional evidence that could support a jury finding of nursing 
negligence, based on testimony from both a physician and other 
nurses that the defendant's nurses had not given proper nursing 
care in the circumstances. 76 
Mundt's focus on a violation of the nursing standard of 
care, shown by expert testimony, sounds perfectly unexcep-
tional; unfortunately, it is an exception. Most courts try to de-
fine the type of obvious physician errors about which a nurse 
should speak up. 
72. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
73. See infra text accompanying notes 127-33. 
74. 223 Cal. App. 2d 413, 35 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1963). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 420-21, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 853. 
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A. Obviousness 
One of the earliest cases to mention speaking up about obvi-
ous physician errors was a 1932 North Carolina case, Byrd v. 
Marion General Hospital.77 The patient was ordered to the hos-
pital for heat treatment in some sort of a sweat box. The attend-
ing physician and a nurse stood by while the patient became 
badly burned. In reversing a jury verdict against the hospital, 78 
the North Carolina Supreme Court declared that "nurses ... 
must obey and diligently execute the orders of the physician . . . 
in charge of the patient, unless, of course, such order was so ob-
viously negligent as to lead any reasonable person to anticipate 
that substantial injury would result."79 The court concluded as a 
matter of law that the treatment at issue was not obviously neg-
ligent.80 To suggest the kind of treatment that would be obvi-
ously negligent, the court noted that "if a physician or surgeon 
should order a nurse to stick fire to a patient, no nurse would be 
protected from liability" for carrying out the order.81 In finding 
the hospital not liable, the court stressed the fact that the physi-
cian was present at the time of the injury: "if the physician is 
present . . . [and approves] the treatment administered by the 
nurse, . . . then in such event the nurse can then assume that 
the treatment is proper under the circumstances, and such treat-
ment, when the physician is present, becomes the treatment of 
the physician and not that of the nurse."82 The court suggested 
by this language that in more compelling circumstances, perhaps 
where the physician is not present, a hospital would be liable for 
an employee nurse's failure to speak up about the physician's 
negligence. 
Quite a few cases have echoed the Byrd court's language. 83 
For example, in Toth v. Community Hospital the court stated in 
dictum that a nurse or other employee was obligated to follow a 
77. 202 N.C. 337, 162 S.E. 738 (1932). 
78. I d. The jury's verdict was for $30,000, shockingly high in the 1930s. I d. at 340, 
162 S.E.2d at 739. 
79. Id. at 341, 162 S.E. at 740. 
80. Id. at 343, 162 S.E. at 741. 
81. Id. at 341, 162 S.E. at 740. "Sticking fire" to the patient is just about what 
happened, but the court saw no irony in its example. 
82. Id. at 343, 162 S.E. at 741. 
83. One court went so far as to quote Byrd on this point (without citation), though 
the language was merely dictum. See McElroy v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 163 
F. Supp. 193, 198 (W.D. Ark. 1958). 
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physician's orders unless those orders were clearly contraindi-
cated.84 In Collins v. Westlake Community Hospital,85 the court 
suggested a similar standard by confining the Darling86 court's 
finding of liability to cases of "grossly improper medical treat-
ment" evidenced by "a multitude of glaringly obvious signals."87 
A year before Collins, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the 
unlocking of a suicidal patient's door by an employee ordered to 
do so by the treating physician was not obviously negligent. 88 
The Washington case discussed earlier, Schoening v. Grays Har-
bor Hospital,89 noted that a "hospital clearly has a duty to inter-
vene in the treatment of its patients if there is obvious negli-
gence."90 Finally, another case applying New York law, 
Schwartz v. Boston Hospital for Women, stated that a hospital 
is not liable for carrying out a physician's orders "unless the 
hospital has actual reason to know or believe that the doctor's 
orders or procedures are 'clearly contraindicated by normal 
practice' .... "91 
Although these formulations seem to specify the circum-
stances in which an employee should recognize malpractice, they 
do not indicate from whose viewpoint obviousness is to be 
judged; thus, they tend to cloud the question of whose testimony· 
is relevant or necessary to a finding that orders are obviously 
erroneous. If the concept of obviousness is to have any meaning, 
it must be tied to someone's point of view. If a nurse, for exam-
ple, must speak up about a physician's obvious errors, the re-
quirement could mean any of at least three things: that the er-
rors are obvious to other physicians, obvious to nurses, or 
84. Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 265 n.3, 239 N.E.2d 368, 374 n.3, 292 
N.Y.S.2d 440, 449 n.3 (1968); see also Killeen v. Reinhardt, 71 A.D.2d 851, 853, 419 
N.Y.S.2d 175, 177 (1979) (citing Toth, 22 N.Y.2d at 265 n.3, 239 N.E.2d at 374 n.3, 292 
N.Y.S.2d at 449 n.3). 
85. 12 Ill. App. 3d 847, 299 N.E.2d 326, rev'd, 57 Ill. 2d 388, 312 N.E.2d 614 (1974). 
86. See supra notes 25-45 and accompanying text. 
87. Collins, 12 lll. App. 3d at 852, 299 N.E.2d at 329; see also McElroy v. Employ-
ers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 163 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Ark. 1958); Czubinsky v. Doctors 
Hosp., 139 Cal. App. 3d 361, 188 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1983); Johnson v. Grant Hosp., 32 Ohio 
St. 2d 169, 291 N.E.2d 440, rev'ing 31 Ohio App. 2d 118, 286 N.E.2d 308 (1972). 
88. Johnson v. Grant Hosp., 32 Ohio St. 2d 169, 178-79, 291 N.E.2d 440, 445-46, 
rev'ing 31 Ohio App. 2d 118, 286 N.E.2d 308 (1972). The patient had left the room and 
jumped out of a window. 
89. Schoening, 40 Wash. App. 331, 698 P.2d 593; see supra notes 61-63 and accom-
panying text. 
90. Schoening, 40 Wash. App. at 335, 698 P.2d at 596. 
91. Schwartz v. Boston Hosp. for Women, 422 F. Supp. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
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obvious to lay parties.92 Each of these interpretations of the "ob-
vious error" rule has some drawbacks. 
1. Obvious to Physicians 
If an employee must speak up about a physician's errors 
that would be obvious only to another physician, liability often 
would be unfairly imposed. A nurse, respiratory therapist, or lab 
technician should not be expected to know that a certain medi-
cal procedure is obviously inappropriate in the circumstances, if 
the nurse or technician has been trained to know no more than 
how to carry out the procedure when asked to do so. Undoubt-
edly, then, the courts referring to obvious errors do not or at 
least should not mean errors obvious only to a physician. 
2. Obvious to Employees 
Perhaps, then, obviously or clearly wrong physician's orders 
mean those orders that should be obvious to the employee who 
is charged with liability for not speaking up. Under this inter-
pretation, a nurse would not be expected to do anything about a 
physician's treatment that was just possibly or arguably im-
proper. A requirement to speak up would be triggered only if the 
treatment were obviously improper to the nurse. Liability would 
be based on the conduct of the employee and judged from the 
employee's viewpoint; this seems intuitively correct. 
In Toth v. Community Hospital,93 the court in dicta im-
posed such a duty on hospital employees. A physician had or-
dered oxygen administered to two premature infants for several 
days; the nursing staff administered it for a much longer time 
period thus blinding the infants. Although the nurses acted 
within the accepted standard of care at the time, prolonged ad-
ministration of oxygen was beginning to be recognized as a cause 
92. 'I:hese differences are not over refined. A completely separate area of law, de-
sign patents, has already shown the necessity of establishing a viewpoint for tests of 
obviousness. Design patents can be granted for designs that are, among other things, not 
obvious. In 1966, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals concluded that obviousness 
was to be judged from the viewpoint of the layperson, or "ordinary observer." In re 
Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003 (C.C.P.A 1966). In 1981, the same court concluded that the more 
appropriate viewpoint was that of the "ordinary designer." In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 
1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981). That the court saw fit to discuss the matter at all shows that the 
question was a significant one. 
93. 22 N.Y.2d 255, 239 N.E.2d 368, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1968). 
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of infant blindness. The court found that the plaintiffs had 
made out a case against the hospital for the nurses' failure to 
follow the physician's instructions.94 In a footnote, the court ob-
served that a hospital employee will be held liable for not speak-
ing up only when a physician issues an order that is "so clearly 
contraindicated by normal practice that ordinary prudence re-
quires inquiry."95 The reference to "ordinary prudence" at first 
sounds like a layperson's standard, but this view is undercut by 
other assertions in the opinion. First, the court spoke of orders 
contraindicated "by normal practice," presumably meaning nor-
mal medical or hospital practice.98 A layperson would not be fa-
miliar with a hospital's normal practice; a nurse or other em-
ployee would be. Second, and more to the point, the court noted 
that a nurse who follows a physician's orders, even when the or-
ders are "contrary to sound medical practice," would be immu-
nized from liability.97 This statement implies that a nurse would 
only be liable for following an order that, from the nurse's view-
point, was "clearly contrary" to sound practice, not just "merely 
contrary." That is, "obvious" or "clearly contraindicated" means 
obvious or clear as judged from the viewpoint of the employee 
charged with negligence for not speaking up. 
This interpretation would be a comfortable one for a court. 
It echoes the standard of appellate review for trial court factual 
findings: they must be clearly erroneous, not just merely errone-
ous.98 A hospital employee who observes a physician's treatment 
with an eye toward speaking up about errors is in many ways in 
the same posture as an appellate court. The physician's greater 
training and primary responsibility for patient welfare deserve 
considerable deference; an appellate court similarly defers to the 
trial court's first-hand appreciation of the evidence and primary 
responsibility for fact finding. There is much to be said, then, 
for interpreting the obvious error requirement to mean obvious 
to the reviewing hospital employee. 
The drawback of this interpretation is that it seems unduly 
94. Id. at 265, 239 N.E.2d at 374, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 449. 
95. Id. at 265 n.3, 239 N.E.2d at 374 n.3, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 449 n.3. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 265, 239 N.E.2d at 374, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 450. 
98. See Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 
(1982); FEn. R. CIV. P. 52(a); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 
13.4, at 601 (1985). 
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protective of the employee. Suppose a physician orders a respir-
atory therapist to do a blood gas analysis for a patient by draw-
ing an arterial blood sample, one when the patient is resting, 
and another when the patient is under stress on a treadmill. 
Suppose the patient complains of chest pains, of which the phy-
sician is aware but dismisses as unrelated to heart problems. 
Suppose further that the therapist suspects heart trouble but 
gives the test anyway, resulting in the patient's death from a 
heart attack. Why should the therapist escape liability if he 
thought the ordering of the test was negligent, but not obviously 
neglig~nt, or contraindicated, but not clearly contraindicated? 
3. Obvious to Lay Parties 
The judicial requirement for speaking up about obvious er-
rors need not, of course, refer to obviousness from the viewpoint 
of either a physician or a hospital employee. The first court to 
use the obviously negligent formulation, Byrd v. Marion General 
Hospital,99 indicated instead that obviousness was to be judged 
from the viewpoint of the untrained layperson. The court not 
only spoke of obvious negligence, but also asserted that a physi-
cian's orders must be obeye.d by hospital employees unless "any 
reasonable person [would] anticipate that substantial injury 
would result to the patient" from carrying out those orders.100 
By referring to "any reasonable person," the court seems to have 
meant tort law's hypothetical reasonable person, that is, some-
one other than a medically trained individual. This view is borne 
out by the fact that the court decided as a matter of law that the 
physician's orders were not obviously negligent.101 Presumably, 
anything other than a layperson's standard would have necessi-
tated expert testimony on this point and hence a remand to the 
trial court. 
Although the Byrd decision is now over fifty years old, in 
1972 the Ohio Supreme Court decided a similar case, Johnson v. 
Grant Hospital/02 in a similar way. In this case a suicidal pa-
tient had been admitted to a general hospital. Her physician or-
99. 202 N.C. 337, 162 S.E. 738 (1932). 
100. !d. at 341, 162 S.E. at 740 (emphasis added). 
101. !d. at 343, 162 S.E. at 741. 
102. 32 Ohio St. 2d 169, 291 N.E.2d 440, rev'ing 31 Ohio App. 2d 118, 286 N.E.2d 
308 (1972). 
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dered the hospital staff to keep the patient locked in her room 
at night, but at her family's urgings, he ordered the room un-
locked during the day. A member of the staff unlocked the door; 
during the next nursing shift, the patient left her room and 
jumped out of a window. The patient's family sued the hospital, 
but lost on a directed verdict. The Ohio Court of Appeals re-
versed on the grounds that any reasonable person either would 
have kept the door locked in spite of what the physician or-
dered, or, having received the order, would have told the next 
nursing shift about the patient's history of attempted suicides.103 
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and rein-
stated the directed verdict.104 The court reasoned that because 
the hospital was not a mental hospital, the physician's order to 
unlock the door was not obviously negligent.105 
The supreme court evidently accepted the appellate court's 
reliance on the standard of a reasonable layperson: it did not 
question the use of that standard, and it found it proper to rein-
state the directed verdict without need of expert testimony. Yet, 
the court found it significant that the hospital was a general, not 
a mental, hospital. This distinction suggests that there is some 
relevant difference between the training or experience of psychi-
atric nurses and other nurses. If a difference in professional 
training or experience is relevant, then expert testimony about 
what a nurse in a general hospital ought to know should have 
been required.106 The court's failure to recognize the need for 
expert testimony could have been avoided by using the approach 
put forth in this Article: a hospital employee's negligence for not 
speaking up should be determined from the testimony of other, 
similarly situated employees about what the reasonable em-
ployee would do. 
Even if the inconsistency in the court's reasoning were elim-
inated, judging physicians' errors from the viewpoint of a layper-
son would have at least three drawbacks. First, in practice, it 
would practically constitute an immunity for hospitals. Very few 
physicians' decisions, even when wrong, would be obviously 
103. Johnson v. Grant Hosp., 31 Ohio App. 2d 118, 286 N.E.2d 308, rev'd, 32 Ohio 
St. 2d 169, 291 N.E.2d 440 (1972). 
104. Johnson, 32 Ohio St. 2d 169, 291 N.E.2d 440. 
105. Id. at 178-79, 291 N.E.2d at 455-56. 
106. C{. Piael v. Stamford Hasp., 180 Conn. 314, 336-38, 430 A.2d 1, 13-14 (1980) 
(several nurses testified to the proper psychiatric nursing care for a psychotic patient). 
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wrong to a person wholly untrained in medicine.107 A court 
might, of course, want to provide hospitals with immunity as a 
matter of policy, but poorly articulated requirements about ob-
viousness and lay parties seems an underhanded way to do it. 
Second, tort law has long provided that defendants with 
special expertise who are engaged in tasks calling for the use of 
that expertise ought to rise to an expert's standard.108 This rule 
applies to physicians/09 airplane pilots,110 architects and engi-
neers, 111 and nurses in nonspeaking up cases, 112 among others. 
There is little reason to treat a speaking up case differently by 
holding a nurse to a lower standard. 
Finally, a layperson's standard implies that patients could 
be found contributorily or comparatively negligent for not 
speaking up about their own mistreatment. Contributory negli-
gence by patients has rarely been argued in cases where the pa-
tient was hospitalized, 113 but it has been in other contexts. 
107. Not surprisingly, then, hospitals themselves would be expected to prefer this 
standard for liability. In the Darling case, for example, the defendant hospital's brief 
argued that a hospital cannot be liable for a nurse's following a physician's order "unless 
such order is so obviously negligent as to lead any reasonable person to anticipate sub-
stantial injury to the patient from its execution." Annat., supra note 26, at 863. Liability 
might well have been found under that test: even a layperson would be likely to suspect 
some problem with a physician's failure to do anything when a patient's toes, protruding 
from a leg cast, turn steadily darker and colder and lose feeling. It would have been an 
appropriate question for the jury to decide whether the physician's failure was simply 
wrong or obviously wrong from a layperson's viewpoint. Yet the Illinois Supreme Court 
implicitly rejected the proposal that obviousness was to be judged from that viewpoint. 
The court held that the jury was entitled to find the nurses negligent for not speaking up 
in a situation in which "skilled nurses recognized" the symptoms of gangrene but did 
nothing about them. Darling, 33 Ill. 2d at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258. The court did not 
indicate whether the nurses recognized, or had to recognize in order to be liable, the 
physician's treatment as obviously wrong or just merely wrong. By focusing on the 
nurse's recognition, however, the court certainly rejected any notion in Byrd that the 
decision to speak up should be made from a lay viewpoint. 
108. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, § 32, at 185-86. 
109. See generally McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. 
L. REV. 549 (1959). 
110. Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 158, 252 S.E.2d 526 (1979). 
111. City of Eveleth v. Ruble, 302 Minn. 249, 225 N.W.2d 521 (1974). See generally 
Bell, Professional Negligence of Architects and Engineers, 12 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1959). 
112. Bamert v. Central Gen. Hasp., 77 A.D.2d 559, 430 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1980). 
113. But see Allman v. Holleman, 233 Kan. 781, 667 P.2d 296 (1983) (finding no 
contributory negligence when a hospital patient tossed and turned so extensively that 
she dislodged an endotrachael breathing tube). Most of the nonhospital contributory 
negligence cases seem to fall into two categories: a patient's failure to come back to a 
physician for follow-up visits, see Annot., 100 AL.R.3D 723 (1980), and a patient's failure 
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These arguments, in fact, have been based on something like a 
requirement that patients themselves speak up about obvious 
negligence. A 1944 Ohio case, Champs v. Stone, is illustrative.114 
The patient visited a physician for a blood test for a marriage 
license. The physician insisted that the patient needed a series 
of injections, though the opinion does not say what they were 
for. The physician was drunk at the time. The patient knew that 
the physician was drunk, but submitted to an injection anyway 
and was injured in the process. A directed verdict for the physi-
cian, on grounds of the patient's contributory negligence, was af-
firmed by the appellate court.U5 When a patient is "fully aware" 
of a physician's intoxication, the court held, an ordinarily careful 
patient would "seriously doubt the physician's ability and . . . 
refuse treatment."116 
At least one other court has set a standard similar to the 
one in Champs, but used it to deny a contributory negligence 
defense. In this 1901 Iowa case, Schoonover v. Holden, 117 a pa-
tient's dislocated knee was treated improperly. In the lawsuit 
that followed, the physician boldly argued that the patient was 
contributorily negligent in not seeking a second opinion about 
her knee when it did not seem to be healing properly. The Iowa 
Supreme Court affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff, stating that "she was not bound to call other physicians un-
less she was fully aware" of her own physician's maltreatment.118 
The fully aware and seriously doubt language is equivalent 
to the obviously negligent or clearly contraindicated language of 
other courts. In fact, the court in a 1977 California case, Barton 
to give a complete medical history when requested to do so by a physician. See Annot., 
33 A.L.R. 4TH 790 (1984). Many of the other so-called contributory negligence cases are 
actually about intervening causes or aggravating negligence: a physician does something 
improper, then later the patient does something improper that aggravates the injury. See 
Jenkins v. Charleston Gen. Hosp. & Training School, 90 W. Va. 230, 238-39, 110 S.E. 
560, 563-64 (1922); Lawrence v. Wirth, 226 Va. 408, 309 S.E.2d 315 (1983). These cases 
are correctly handled not by upholding contributory negligence as a complete defense 
but by reducing the patient's recovery in an amount attributable to the patient's own 
negligence. 
114. 74 Ohio App. 344, 58 N.E.2d 803 (1944). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 349, 58 N.E.2d at 805. 
117. 87 N.W. 737 (Iowa 1901) (per curiam). 
118. Id.; see also Halverson v. Zimmerman, 60 N.D. 113, 125, 232 N.W. 754, 758 
(1930) ("fully cognizant"). 
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v. Owen, 119 stated in dictum that "when a doctor's negligence is 
'obvious' to anyone as a matter of common sense, i.e., the leav-
ing in of a sponge, so might there arise similar situations on the 
part of the plaintiff where his negligence is similarly 'obvi-
ous.' "120 Under any of these formulations, if the assessment is to 
be made from the layperson's viewpoint, a patient could be held 
contributorily or comparatively negligent for not speaking up 
about his own maltreatment.121 
To be sure, a different threshold-specifically requiring ob-
viousness to be judged from a nurse's perspective-would not 
eliminate the possibility of contributory negligence in those 
cases in which a physician's error was obvious to any reasonable 
person as well as to a nurse. The use of the nurse's perspective 
alone as a standard at least would allow speaking up cases to go 
forward to trial. If the standard were assessed from the layper-
son's perspective only, then plaintiffs who had been conscious of 
their treatment would be barred from suit by definition. Merely 
119. 71 Cal. App. 3d 484, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1977). 
120. !d. at 506, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 506. 
121. One unusual case, Southeastern Ky. Baptist Hosp. v. Bruce, 539 S.W.2d 286 
(Ky. 1976), has actually touched on the possibility of a patient's being contributorily 
negligent in regard to a speaking up situation. A patient named Gladys Bruce was in the 
hospital for surgery, waiting in her room. From the operating room, a surgeon instructed 
the hospital staff to prepare their next patient, a woman named Jessie Smith, for a thy-
roidectomy. For reasons that could never be explained, a staff member went to Ms. 
Bruce's room instead of Ms. Smith's. He evidently asked if Ms. Bruce were Jessie Smith, 
and Ms. Bruce answered yes, she was. Ms. Bruce was accordingly wheeled into surgery, 
where the surgeon proceeded to operate without checking her identification bracelet un-
til after the initial incision. 
Ms. Bruce brought suit against both the surgeon and the hospital. The jury returned 
a verdict against both; the hospital appealed on the grounds that Ms. Bruce had been 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law in answering to the name Smith. The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court concluded that Ms. Bruce, in a naturally confused condition before 
surgery, had not been contributorily negligent in answering as she did. Id. at 287-88. 
(Kentucky applied the contributory negligence rule until 1984. See Hilen v. Hays, 673 
S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).) 
Though literally a case of too much speaking up, Bruce is plainly a situation in 
which a defendant argued contributory negligence for a patient's failure to correct an 
improper procedure undertaken by hospital employees. The case is not squarely on point 
with the situation being examined in this Article, because it dealt with hospital employ-
ees', not physicians', improper acts. Thus, Bruce cannot stand for the broad proposition 
that physicians' errors are to be judged from a lay standpoint. The error in the case was 
confusion over who was in which room, an error, even if made by a physician, that can 
readily be judged by any reasonable person. Yet the case illustrates well the point that if 
a hospital employee, and by analogy, a physician, can be negligent, so can a patient for 
not speaking up about it. 
1986] WHEN DOCTRINES COLLIDE 117 
alleging that the physician's error was obvious to a layperson 
necessarily would entail the conclusion that it was obvious to the 
patient; negligence by a nurse for not speaking up would mean 
negligence by the patient as well. On balance, judging obvi-
ousness from the viewpoint of laypersons is therefore 
unsatisfactory. 
B. Substantial Departure 
Although a number of courts rely on a test of obvious error 
or clear contraindication, the defendant hospital in Poor Sisters 
of St. Francis v. Catron122 offered as a test the requirement that 
employees speak up about substantial departures from proper 
medical treatment. This formulation, not yet adopted by any 
court, seems to take the focus of analysis away from the observ-
ing employee and shift it to the physician whose improper con-
duct is observed by the employee. The departure must refer to 
the physician's departure from the usual standard. 
Yet the same problems of interpretation complicate this 
standard that complicate the obvious formula. What is "sub-
stantial" is, after all, in the eye of the beholder. A substantial 
departure could mean a departure deviating so sharply from the 
norm that even a layperson would recognize it. In this version, 
the test is similar to the Byrd suggestion that maltreatment 
must be obvious even to a layperson.123 On the other hand, if 
there is a difference between the Poor Sisters and Byrd stan-
dards, a substantial departure is one that would cause layper-
sons to observe that something was amiss, but not that it was 
obviously or substantially amiss. Again, substantiality could be 
intended to refer to the employee's perspective, not the layper-
son's. A court using this test might find liability for not speaking 
up when a nurse or other employee would regard the physician's 
acts as a substantial departure from the ordinary. Or perhaps 
the requirement means that substantial departures are those va-
rying so extremely from the normal physicians' standard of care 
as to be recognizable as departures by a hospital employee, but 
not necessarily as substantial departures. The substantial depar-
ture rule, in short, is at least as ambiguous as the obviously neg-
ligent rule. 
122. 435 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
123. Byrd, 202 N.C. at 341, 162 S.E. at 740. 
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C. Any Departure 
In Poor Sisters of St. Francis, the court rejected the sub-
stantial departure rule, holding instead that a hospital employee 
must speak up about a physician's treatment that is simply "not 
in accord with standard medical practice. "~24 Evidently the court 
used "not in accord with" to mean something like "any depar-
ture from." The defendant hospital's proposed jury instruction 
stated a requirement for its employees to speak up whenever a 
physician's treatment was "a substantial departure from ac-
cepted medical standards. "125 The court's choice of "not in ac-
cord" thus appears to be in pointed contrast to the hospital's 
suggested instruction. 
On its facts, Poor Sisters of St. Francis126 is a good case for 
suggesting that nurses should speak up about any departure 
from standards. A physician inserted an endotracheal tube into 
a patient who had breathing difficulty and left it in place for five 
days. The patient's larynx became scarred, resulting in either 
permanent or long-term impairment to her breathing and speak-
ing. Testimony at the trial showed that both nurses and inhala-
tion therapists knew that as a rule of thumb, endotracheal tubes 
should be left in place for three days at most. 
The court, then, simply required nurses and therapists to 
speak up about a possible maltreatment of which testimony 
showed they were well aware. Unfortunately, the court's lan-
guage was far broader than its holding and appears to state a 
general rule that would define a hospital employee's duty by re-
ferring to a physician's conduct. Indeed, the rule, though per-
haps used to reach a sensible result in the case, seems patently 
wrong. Surely there will be cases in which a physician's depar-
ture from the norm would not be recognized by a hospital em-
ployee, like a nurse, or even by a physician trained in a different 
specialty. If there were no such cases, there would be no need for 
expert testimony by physicians in malpractice cases; any hospi-
tal employee could testify to a physician's departure from medi-
cal standards. Of course, courts have not relaxed the require-
ment for expert testimony to anything approaching that degree. 
124. Poor Sisters of St. Francis, 435 N.E.2d at 308-09. 
125. Id. at 307. 
126. Id. at 308. 
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If a nonphysician employee is not qualified to testify to a physi-
cian's maltreatment, then the same employee should not be lia-
ble for not speaking up about that maltreatment. One doubts 
that the court would adhere to its own rule in a less compelling 
case. 
D. Employee training 
In a less compelling case, the most likely modification to an 
any departure rule would be to refine the requirement so that an 
employee must speak up about any departure that the employee 
should recognize as such. As modified, the rule makes far more 
sense, and conforms to the court's actual holding in Poor Sisters 
of St. Francis. Several other courts have also implicitly recog-
nized this standard. 
In Brook v. Saint John's Hickey Memorial Hospital/27 for 
example, the Indiana Supreme Court considered an action 
against a hospital for the alleged negligence of an X-ray techni-
cian. A radiologist administered a necessary injection into a 
child's calf muscle, an unusual site for injections. X-ray techni-
cians observed, but said nothing. Four months later the child 
developed a shortening of the achilles tendon that may have 
been due to trauma at the injection site. The child's parents 
sued the hospital on the theory that the technicians were obliged 
to report the unusual injection site to the hospital administra-
tion. The court concluded that a directed verdict in favor of the 
hospital had been proper: the plaintiffs had introduced no evi-
dence that the technicians were "qualified by any training to 
know the propriety of injection sites."~28 The court noted that 
technicians were required only to graduate from a two-year 
training program, and had no requirement of licensure.129 
127. 269 Ind. 270, 380 N.E.2d 72 (1978). 
128. Id. at 273, 380 N.E.2d at 74. In fact, there appears to have been evidence 
concerning the technicians' training. One of the plaintiff's experts testified to the proper 
knowledge of X-ray technicians. The expert, trained in both law and medicine, seems to 
have been viewed with some suspicion by the court: his testimony was dismissed as "so-
phistic" and "pure speculation."Id. at 274, 380 N.E. 2d at 75 (emphasis in original). 
129. Id. at 274, 380 N.E.2d at 75. The court may have been additionally persuaded 
to its result by the fact that the radiologist did not appear to be negligent in selecting 
the injection site. A court hardly would be interested in ordering a new trial for a techni-
cian's failure to report something that the evidence showed was perfectly proper in the 
first place. Medical literature cautioned against injections in the buttocks or thighs of 
small children. The physician had decided to give the injection in the calf muscle as the 
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The absence of licensure is irrelevant only in that it sug-
gests a low degree of training and knowledge. By implication, an 
employee with more training and knowledge would be required 
to speak up. Interpreted in this fashion, the opinion implies that 
an employee who could recognize a physician's departure from 
customary care should speak up about it or risk liability. 
Whether the court would actually reach this implicit holding in 
an appropriate case is another question. 
A similar view appears in Walker v. United States/80 a suit 
brought in 1982 under the Federal Tort Claims Act.131 The 
plaintiff, a retired military serviceman, entered a military hospi-
tal for kidney surgery. The operating physician, whom the court 
found to be an independent contractor and therefore not a gov-
ernment employee, stitched an internal incision with nonabsorb-
able filament. A kidney stone later formed around the filament 
and necessitated further surgery. The plaintiff's case against the 
gqvernment for the operating physician's acts was dismissed be-
cause the Federal Tort Claims Act immunized the government 
for the acts of independent contractors.132 
More importantly, the plaintiff's case against other operat-
ing room personnel failed as well. The court found that neither 
an orthopedic surgeon, who was present during the operation 
but did not perform the surgery, "nor any of the other Hospital 
personnel in the operating room knew, or by training should 
have known, whether the use of a nonabsorbable suture . . . 
might cause the formation of kidney stones . . . . Hence, none 
of them could have acted negligently by failing to object [to its 
use]."133 Like the Brook court, however, the court in Walker did 
not state what conditions were necessary to a finding of liability. 
It merely decided that liability could be found when an em-
ployee is not trained to know that a physician's treatment is 
improper.134 
A requirement to speak up about any departure the em-
ployee is trained to recognize is more sensible than a require-
next largest muscle mass. Id. at 273, 380 N.E.2d at 74. 
130. 549 F. Supp. 973 (W.D. Okla. 1982). 
131. 28 u.s.c. § 1346(b) (1982). 
132. Walker, 549 F. Supp. at 975-76. 
133. Id. at 979. 
134. Id. 
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ment to speak up about any departure at all. Yet, this require-
ment is unnecessarily limited because it focuses on training to 
the exclusion of experience. An X-ray technician, for example, 
could have observed hundreds of injections given to children and 
would have noticed that none of them were given in the calf 
muscle, despite a lack of training on the procedure. Quite apart 
from formal training, an employee acquires knowledge through 
experience about normal medical practice. Accordingly, there is 
no reason to confine the inquiry to the employee's training 
alone; a focus on what other, reasonable employees would do 
under the circumstances would necessarily take both training 
and experience into account. 
IV. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND "THE HosPITAL" 
In contrast to those cases that describe liability in terms of 
an employee's obligation to speak up, another line of cases has 
cast liability rules in the form of hospital duties or hospital stan-
dards of care.135 The cases are typically based on respondeat su-
perior, not corporate negligence. When a court uses the term 
"hospital" in a respondeat superior case, it ought to use it as a 
metaphor; it should mean the hospital as employer of an em-
ployee alleged to have been negligent. Unfortunately, in some of 
these cases, the repeated reference to "the hospital" prevents a 
focus on the nurse or other employee who should speak up and, 
consequently, diverts attention from the question of what testi-
mony or evidence can be used to show the employee's negli-
gence. Perhaps this oversight is merely a drawback of an over-
reliance on a convenient shorthand, but one suspects it is also a 
manifestation of the commentators' and courts' increasing atten-
tion to hospitals as corporate entities under the corporate negli-
gence theory. 
The court in Bost v. Riley186 suggests the latter influence. 
This court treated the case, discussed above, 137 as one of corpo-
rate negligence. In reviewing other North Carolina cases that 
had "implicitly" adopted the theory, the court mentioned Byrd 
135. Alden v. Providence Hosp., 382 F.2d 163, 166 (D. C. Cir. 1967) (hospital duty); 
Darling, 33 m. 2d at 330-31, 211 N.E.2d at 256-57 (hospital standard of care); Johnson v. 
Saint Bernard Hosp., 79 ill. App. 3d 709, 716, 399 N.E.2d 198, 204-05 (1979) (discussing 
both). 
136. Bast, 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391. 
137. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49. 
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v. Marion County Hospital, 138 the 1932 case in which a nurse 
was present while a physician directed that a patient remain 
under a heat treatment too long.139 The Bost opinion character-
ized Byrd as holding that "[t]he hospital has the duty not to 
obey instructions of a physician which are obviously negligent or 
dangerous. "140 
The characterization of Byrd as implicitly adopting the ap-
proach of corporate negligence is strained. The suit was brought 
against the nurse personally and against the hospital's proprie-
tor personally under respondeat superior. Byrd was, therefore, a 
simple case of nursing negligence. The characterization would 
not matter, except that it led the Bost court to overlook the pos-
sibility of nursing negligence in that case.141 
This reference to the "hospital" as an entity arises occasion-
ally in hospitals' defenses to speaking up cases in the form of an 
assertion that "a hospital cannot practice medicine."~42 Evi-
dently this statement means that corporate entities like hospi-
tals cannot obtain a license to practice medicine. Certainly, a 
hospital as such cannot practice medicine, just as it cannot go to 
medical school or take an exam. Individuals can do all these 
things, however, and can be employed by a hospital, which can 
have respondeat superior liability for their negligence. That "a 
hospital cannot practice medicine" is simply incorrect if it refers 
to a hospital as an employer of physicians; if it refers to the hos-
pital solely as an entity, it is correct, but irrelevant. 
If assertions about hospitals as such were confined to de-
fendants' arguments, no harm would result. But courts also fre-
quently refer to the "hospital" in a way that steers their atten-
tion away from the direct question of employee negligence. 
These cases, including some speaking up situations and some 
situations of employee negligence alone, posit a variety of hospi-
tal duties. These duties, like the duties imposed directly on em-
138. Byrd, 202 N.C. 337, 162 S.E. 738. 
139. Bast, 44 N.C. App. at 647, 262 S.E.2d at 396. 
140. Id. at 647, 262 S.E.2d at 396 (emphasis added). 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49. 
142. See Johnson v. Saint Bernard Hasp., 79 ill. App. 3d 709, 718, 399 N.E.2d 198, 
205 (1979); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 414-16, 227 N.E.2d 296, 299-300, 280 
N.Y.S.2d 373, 378-79 (1967); see also Slawkowski, supra note 12, at 468 ("hospitals do 
not practice medicine"). 
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ployees, 143 vary among different jurisdictions. For example, some 
courts state that a hospital has an obligation to exercise the 
same degree of care for its patients that other similar hospitals 
would exercise.144 Many courts have stated that hospitals must 
give patients the care that their known condition requires, 145 or 
the care that their patients' condition, whether actually known 
or reasonably knowable, requires.146 Other courts have tried to 
combine these standards by saying that a hospital has a duty "to 
give the patient such reasonable care and attention as his condi-
tion requires. 'This duty is measured by the degree of care, skill 
and diligence customarily exercised by hospitals generally in the 
community.' "147 Finally, one court has recognized the conflict 
between the different standards and has distinguished them by 
finding that for medical care, the standard is what other, similar 
hospitals would do; but for routine, administrative care, the 
standard is what is reasonable in light of the patient's 
condition.148 
None of these formulations is satisfactory. Combining dif-
ferent standards seems reasonable on the surface: hospitals must 
give patients the care they require, a duty measured by what 
other hospitals would do. But if the duty is measured by what 
other hospitals do, speaking of the care that patients require is 
either redundant or meaningless. Neither does this formulation 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 68-121. 
144. Johnson v_ Saint Bernard Hosp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 716, 718, 399 N.E.2d 198, 
204, 205 (1979); Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 737-38, 301 
N.W.2d 156, 171 (1981). 
145. This formulation of the rule is so common that it is listed as "the" rule in 
Corpus Juris Secundum under "Hospital," § 8, which cites the following cases, among 
others, in footnote 70: Emerick v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 133 Cal. App. 3d 575, 581, 184 
Cal. Rptr. 92, 95 (1982); Hawthorne v. Blythewood Inc., 118 Conn. 617, 623, 174 A. 81, 84 
(1934); Piedmont Hosp. v. Anderson, 65 Ga. App. 491, 497, 16 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1941); 
Paulen v. Shinnick, 291 Mich. 288, 290-91, 289 N.W. 162, 163 (1939); Flower Hosp. v. 
Hart, 178 Okla. 447, 449-50, 62 P.2d 1248, 1250 (1936) (quoting Tulsa Hosp. Ass'n v. 
Juby, 73 Okla. 243, 247-48, 175 P. 519, 523 (1918)). 41 C.J.S. Hospital§ 8 (1944 & Supp. 
1986). 
146. Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 173 N.W.2d 881 
(1970). 
147. Alden v. Providence Hosp., 382 F.2d 163, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (quoting Gar-
field Memorial Hosp. v. Marshall, 204 F.2d 721, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1953)); see also Rice v. 
California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal. 2d 296, 299, 163 P.2d 860, 862 (1945) (quoting Wood 
v. Samaritan Inst., 26 Cal. 2d 847, 851, 161 P.2d 556, 558 (1945) (quoting 41 C.J.S., Hos-
pitals, § 8(3), at 349 (1944))). 
148. Kastler v. Iowa Methodist Hosp., 193 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 1971). 
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specify exactly who is or is not qualified to testify to what "other 
hospitals" do. 
The last mentioned approach, that one standard applies to 
medical care and another to routine care, requires courts to 
make the distinction between medical and routine or adminis-
trative activities. For years, courts in some states have made 
that distinction for another purpose: to know whether the re-
spondeat superior doctrine should be applied against a hospital 
for the acts of physicians or nurses who were concededly em-
ployees of the hospital.149 Until the 1960s the rule in these states 
was that a hospital had respondeat superior liability for the ad-
ministrative or ministerial acts of its employees, including physi-
cians and nurses, but no liability for their medical decisions.1150 
Other states rejected such a distinction.1151 But even New York, 
which made much of the distinction, finally abandoned it in 
1957 in Bing v. Thunig. 1152 Part of the reason for abandoning it, 
according to the New York Court of Appeals, was the difficulty 
of making the distinction in close cases. The court in Bing cited 
other cases as examples, finding that: 
Placing an improperly capped hot water bottle on a patient's 
body is administrative . . . while keeping a hot water bottle 
too long on a patient's body is medical. . . . Administering 
blood ... to the wrong patient is administrative ... while ad-
ministering the wrong blood to the right patient is medical.1153 
These and other examples persuaded the court that the distinc-
tions rested on "neither guiding principle nor clear delineation 
of policy."~154 
If courts are now to make these same distinctions in speak-
ing up cases, they are likely to find the distinctions just as un-
149. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957); see also 
Schoonover v. Holden, 87 N.W. 737 (Iowa 1901); Pivar v. Manhattan Gen., Inc., 279 A.D. 
522, 110 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1952). But see Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933). 
150. See, e.g., Messina v. Societe Francaise de Bienfaissance, 170 So. 801, 806·07 
(La. Ct. App. 1936) (Janvier, J., concurring); Pivar v. Manhattan Gen., Inc., 279 A.D. 
522, 524-25, 110 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789 (1952); Steinert v. Brunswick Home, Inc., 172 Misc. 
787, 789, 16 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 259 A.D. 1018, 20 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1940). 
151. See, e.g., Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933); Moeller v. Hauser, 
237 Minn. 368, 377-78, 54 N.W.2d 639, 645-46 (1952). 
152. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957). 
153. Id. at 660-61, 143 N.E.2d at 4, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 6 (citations omitted). 
154. Id. at 661, 143 N.E.2d at 5, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 6. 
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satisfactory as the New York court did. A straightforward ap-
proach, recommended in this Article, would be for courts to 
avoid trying to impose duties on the "hospital" itself, but simply 
to ask which employee observed the physician's error, and 
whether similar, reasonable employees would have spoken up 
under the same circumstances. This focus on the employee 
would allow a court to get directly to the question of who must 
testify to the employee's exercise of due care. 
V. A NEGLIGENCE FORMULA 
The permutations of obvious negligence, clear contraindica-
tion, substantial departure, any departure, and any recognizable 
departure with the different viewpoints of physician, employee, 
layperson, and hospital, seem inexhaustible. One thing is clear: 
little analysis or thought has gone into the development of these 
judicially created tests of liability for failure to speak up. The 
tests are too ambiguous to be of meaningful help in future cases. 
The inevitable conclusion is that these tests are not tests at all, 
but court-imposed duties. As in many negligence cases decided 
on the basis of duty, the formulation of a specific duty is as 
much a statement of results as it is a basis for those results.11111 
That the duty concept is used merely to label the end result is , 
clear. In Byrd,I116 for example, the court dismissed the action 
against a nurse by concluding as a matter of law that the physi-
cian's conduct was not obviously negligent. The court found no 
need to consider seriously what obvious meant or from whose 
viewpoint it was to be judged. 
A similar manipulation of the concept of duty can be found 
in then-circuit Judge Burger's concurring and dissenting opinion 
in Alden v. Providence Hospital.167 In Alden, a treating physi-
cian had ordered his patient transferred to another facility. The 
patient was suffering from undiagnosed lung disorders and 
claimed that his transfer exacerbated his illness. He sued the 
hospital for not countermanding the physician's order. The ma-
jority found that he had made out a prima facie case against the 
155. See Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 338, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 
159 (1982). 
156. Byrd, 202 N.C. 337, 162 S.E. 738. 
157. 382 F.2d 163, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
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hospital.1118 Judge Burger, however, challenged the majority to 
find any evidence in the record showing that the hospital had a 
duty to make its own diagnosis before discharging a patient.1119 
What makes Judge Burger,s statement so suspect is that duty is 
purely a legal requirement, to be imposed by the court.160 Du-
ties, therefore, cannot be found from any evidence in the record. 
Many of the cases discussed so far show a similar lack of reason-
ing: they offer purely legal conclusions framed in terms of partic-
ularized duties. 
But to say that courts decide many of these cases almost 
instinctively, and then simply label the result with some sort of 
duty specification, is not to say that the cases are wrongly de-
cided or that judicial instincts are flawed. Courts inevitably 
must balance a number of competing objectives in these cases; 
the formulation of duty rules is an understandable effort to ef-
fect that balance. On the one hand, a too-ready imposition of 
liability provides an incentive for employees to speak up about 
everything. Constant back seat driving like this would either be-
come perfunctory and meaningless or would undermine physi-
cians, authority and make every medical· order the subject of 
scrutiny and debate. Just as an army cannot afford to have the 
enlisted troops question every offi.cer,s directive, a hospital can-
not afford to have employees question every medical directive. 
On the other hand, requiring employees to speak up only when a 
physician,s treatment would be obviously wrong to a layperson 
goes too far in the other direction. If a nurse is trained to recog-
nize when a patient is steadily bleeding to death, why should the 
fact that this is not obvious to a layperson immunize the nurse 
from liability? 
Another consideration enters the picture as well. It is possi-
ble for physicians to deviate from the standard of medical care 
by falling below it. But it is also possible for a physician to devi-
ate above the standard of care.161 That is, a particular physician 
may use an unusual treatment that departs from customary care 
precisely because it is superior to customary care. The calf mus-
158. Id. at 165. 
159. Id. at 168-69. 
160. PROSSER & KEEToN, supra note 14, § 53. 
161. See McClarin v. Grenzfelder, 147 Mo. App. 478, 488-89, 126 S.W. 817, 821 
(1910). 
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cle injection in Brook v. Saint John's Hickey Memorial Hospi-
taP62 is such an example. The technician might well have been 
able to say-had the court inquired-that the calf muscle is not 
the usual site for injections. Yet, from all that appears in the 
case, the physician's choice was a highly intelligent one, based 
on a thoughtful consideration of past practices. Similarly, in 
Toth v. Community Hospitali63 the physician's order for re-
duced oxygen administration to premature infants was a depar-
ture from normal practice. Yet it was the correct order; custom-
ary practice, as followed by the nurses, caused the injury. 
Requiring an employee to speak up in these cases serves no pur-
pose but delay. 
To put it another way, hospital employees are faced with 
two possibilities, "type 1" and "type 2" harms.164 A type 1 harm 
is the harm to patients when an employee fails to speak up 
about a physician's maltreatment. A type 2 harm is the general 
harm to orderly hospital functioning when an employee speaks 
up unnecessarily about a physician's treatment that is either 
within the customary standard of care or better than that stan-
dard. Part of a court's determination of speaking up duties may 
well turn on an intuitive feeling for which of the two types of 
errors is the more likely. If a judge thinks that physicians rarely 
err and are frequently better than average, then type 2 errors 
are more likely than type 1 errors. A liability rule responsive to 
this situation would tend to minimize speaking up behavior by 
establishing a duty based on errors obvious to a layperson. Con-
versely, if a judge thinks that physicians frequently make mis-
takes that could be corrected by the observing employees, then 
the likelihood of type 1 errors is much higher. A rule responsive 
to this view would center on a requirement to speak up about 
any deviation from standard practice. 
Like most tort dilemmas, the question of the relative likeli-
hood of type 1 and type 2 errors is both an empirical question 
that can be answered properly only by careful studies, and an 
empirical question that in all likelihood will never be answered 
162. 269 Ind. 270, 380 N.E.2d 72 (1978). 
163. 22 N.Y.2d 255, 239 N.E.2d 368, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1968). 
164. The terms come from the field of statistics, where they are used to indicate 
the different types of errors possible when deciding whether two samples derive from the 
same population. See N. DowNIE & R HEATH, BASIC STATISTICAL METHODS 129 (1965). 
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by careful studies. Even if accurate numbers are forthcoming, 
however, we can visualize the relationship among these concepts 
in a graphic way that may help in understanding what courts are 
doing in setting a variety of duties in speaking up cases. The 
starting point for this analysis is the Learned Hand cost-benefit 
formula.165 
Under the traditional Learned Hand formula, a defendant is 
liable in negligence if the cost of preventing a harm is less than 
the expected loss from that harm. That is, negligence exists if 
, B <PL 
where B is the burden or cost of preventing a harm, P is the 
probability of the harm's occurring, and L is the loss that will 
fall on the plaintiff if the harm does occur. 
At first glance, the Hand formula seems to impose liability 
in every speaking up case. Whatever the probable loss to an im-
properly treated patient, the burden of speaking up-asking the 
treating physician to re-evaluate orders or asking a hospital resi-
dent or chief of staff to comment or consult-appears trivial. As 
noted before, however, this narrow view would result in requir-
ing employees to speak up about almost everything, well past 
the point of diminishing returns. The burden, then, may be 
viewed more accurately as the burden on the hospital as a whole 
from too much speaking up. This makes B in the formula larger 
than first appears, reflecting the possibility of type 2 errors: 
speaking up unnecessarily. 
Second, the burden on a nurse of speaking up will fre-
quently be the burden of questioning a physician's orders. Ques-
tioning a physician is not likely to come easily to a nurse, nor is 
it likely to be conducive to career advancement or job security. 
The authoritarian relationship of physician to nurse is therefore 
an intangible, but real, element in the burden on a nurse of 
speaking up.166 Once again, B is greater than it first appears. 
165. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
166. V. HENDERSON & G. NITE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF NURSING 953 (6th ed. 
1978) ("[T]he communication and interpersonal relationships of physicians and nurses 
have been characterized ·for the most part by medical authoritarianism and nursing de-
pendence."); see alsoP. ANDERSON, NURSE 222 (1978) ("[S]ince doctors don't often ask a 
nurse's opinion, I guess it's not surprising that when a nurse offers a suggestion, she 
sometimes gets a flip answer. A doctor may say, 'what are you trying to do, teach me my 
business?' "). I also base the assertion in the text on anecdotal evidence from friends who 
are or have been nurses. 
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Third, the possibility of type 1 errors needs to be figured 
into the analysis. Here, the situation gets a bit more compli-
cated. In the ordinary negligence case, PL reflects a simple dis-
counting of harm by the likelihood that the harm will come to 
pass. But the hospital employee observing a physician's treat-
ment is one step removed from the product of P and L. The 
physician directing the treatment already will have performed a 
kind of cost-benefit analysis for different treatment options, 
weighing the benefits of the treatment against the possible 
harms from the treatment. The employee considering possible 
harm to the patient will therefore have to take into account that 
the physician already may have made an appropriate risk-bene-
fit analysis. 
Any physician's treatment, in short, will involve a certain 
risk of harm or PL. What the employee in a position to speak up 
must consider is not just that risk of harm, but also the likeli-
hood that the physician's exposure of the patient to that risk of 
harm was improper. The employee must discount PL by the 
probability that the treating physician has done the wrong thing 
in choosing that particular PL. Therefore, the employee's 
Learned Hand formula looks like this: 
B < P2P1L 
Here, P1 is the probability that the patient will suffer a harm of 
L from the physician's treatment; and P2 is the probability that 
the physician erred by prescribing that treatment. 
Whatever the value of P1 and P2, as probabilities they will 
each be less than one, and their product will be smaller than 
either alone. Compared to a situation in which an employee 
merely had to assess the product of P and L, the smaller product 
of P1, P2, and L reduces the number of occasions in which the 
burden of speaking up will be less than the likely harm, and 
hence, the number of occasions in which the Hand formula will 
suggest negligence for not speaking up. Although it would be dif-
ficult to assign specific numbers to the two probabilities P1 and 
P2 in a particular case, it is possible to draw some inexact con-
clusions about their relationship. In particular, if a physician or-
ders a treatment that has a very low probability of harm (low 
P1), we would expect there to be little likelihood that the treat-
ment was incorrect (low P2). Conversely, if the physician's treat-
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ment carries a very large probability of harm (high P1), we 
would expect that the treatment was far more likely to be incor-
rect (high P2). 
In short, in the absence of data giving us a more accurate 
picture, we would intuitively expect that a low P1 would be 
matched by a low P2, and a high P1 by a high P2. At this level 
of accuracy, which is admittedly a pretty low level, we can sim-
plify things even further and assume that the two probabilities 
P1 and P2 are directly proportional to each other; and further, 
because it eases the calculation slightly, that they are equal to 
each other. These simplifying assumptions do not alter the con-
clusion, as long as the two probabilities are in fact correlated 
such that when one is low, the other is also low, and when one is 
high, the other is also high. The Hand formula now becomes: 
B < PPL 
or 
B < p2L 
For any given amount of burden in speaking up, we can now see 
graphically what PL would be, and what p2L would be in 
comparison. 
.5 
Probability 
Graph of the Learned Hand formula 
with B set at any arbitrary 
value. showing the relationship 
of L, P, and P' 
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The original Hand formula with only PL means that for any 
given burden, all the possible combinations of PL that fall above 
and to the right of the PL curve-that is, are greater than 
B-represent the area in which there is negligence. The speaking 
up situation, which is shown by the upper curve representing 
P2L, bounds a smaller area of negligence, to the upper right. 
This confirms graphically why it is incorrect for a court to re-
quire employees to speak up about any deviation from a physi-
cian's standard of care. The any deviation line is the line bound-
ing the physician's negligence, PL. The employee's boundary is 
P2L, which intuitively corresponds with the judicial requirement 
of speaking up about obvious negligence or clearly contraindi-
cated orders or something more than just any departure from 
customary care standards. 
A second look at the facts of the speaking up cases confirms 
this cost-benefit approach. In almost all of the cases finding lia-
bility or allowing the issue to go to the jury, one theme is domi-
nant: a patient's progressive decline over a period of hours or 
days. In Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospi-
tafl61 and Utter v. United Hospital Center/68 days went by 
while the patient's limb blackened and gangrene set in; in Goff 
v. Doctors General Hospital of San Jose/69 hours went by while 
the patient slowly bled to death; in Poor Sisters of St. Francis v. 
Catron, 170 several days elapsed while an endotracheal tube in-
jured the patient's throat; in Alden v. Providence Hospital,171 a 
patient with several days of breathing difficulties, yellow fluid in 
the lungs, and opaque lung X-rays was nevertheless transferred 
to another hospital w~thout any diagnosis of lung disease; in Oh-
ligschlager v. Proctor Community Hospital, 172 a caustic medica-
tion administered intravenously slowly leaked into the patient's 
arm tissue over almost twelve hours; in Mundt v. Alta Bates 
Hospital, 173 a case similar to Ohligschlager, an intravenous solu-
tion slowly leaked into the patient's arm for more than twelve 
167. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). 
168. 236 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1977). 
169. 166 Cal. App. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 29 (1958). 
170. 435 N.E.2d 305 (Ind. App. 1982). 
171. 382 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
172. 55 Ill. 2d 411, 303 N.E.2d 392 (1973), rev'g, 6 Ill. App. 3d 81, 283 N.E.2d 86 
(1972). 
173. 223 Cal. App. 2d 413-, 35 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1963). 
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hours before matters were attended to; and finally, in Schoening 
v. Grays Harbor Community Hospital,174 the plaintiff's condi-
tion went steadily downhill for seven days before his transfer to 
another hospital. 
Conversely, a common thread in many cases denying hospi-
tal liability is an allegation that a physician's maltreatment oc-
curred over a relatively short period of time, or without evidence 
that the patient's condition progressively deteriorated.175 In 
Brook v. Saint John's Hickey Memorial Hospital/76 for exam-
ple, the claim was that an X-ray technician should have recog-
nized that a child's calf muscle is an improper site for an injec-
tion. An injection is completed in a matter of seconds. In 
Johnson v. Grant Hospital/77 the hospital employees followed a 
physician's orders in unlocking a suicidal patient's room. The 
patient later left the room and jumped out of a window to her 
death, but the hospital was found not to be liable. The patient 
did not experience any progressive deterioration over the several 
hours from the unlocking of the door to the suicide. In 
Walker/78 the nonabsorbable suture would have been put into 
place within a matter of minutes. 
These cases of progressive decline make good sense both in-
tuitively and in terms of the Hand formula. As time passes for a 
deteriorating patient, all of the variables-B, P1, P2, and 
L-shift toward liability. Looking at the opposite situation of a 
sudden emergency helps to show why that is so. In emergencies, 
there is a premium on quick, decisive action. Requiring employ-
ees to speak up in that situation would mean forcing a rethink-
174. 40 Wash. App. 331, 698 P.2d 593 (1985). 
175. See the discussion and notes immediately following. Not all cases, however, 
neatly fit this pattern. For example, in Czubinsky v. Doctor's Hosp., 139 Cal. App. 3d 
361, 188 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1983), a surgeon ordered a nurse to leave a postoperative patient 
in the operating room and attend a second surgery with him in another room. The nurse 
resisted because hospital regulations required her to stay and assist the anesthesiologist 
in reviving the patient. The surgeon yelled at her, according to her testimony, so she left 
with him. The patient suffered a cardiac arrest with consequent injuries that the pres-
ence of the nurse would have prevented. The court found her conduct to be in violation 
of the hospital's written procedures, and the hospital to be liable as her employer. This 
case represents a situation in which liability was imposed even though a patient was not 
progressively declining over an extended period of time. 
176. 269 Ind. 270, 380 N.E.2d 72 (1978). 
177. 32 Ohio St. 2d 169, 291 N.E.2d 440, rev'g 31 Ohio App. 118, 286 N.E.2d 308 
(1972). 
178. 549 F. Supp. 973 (W.D. Okla. 1982). 
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ing of the treatment or putting the patient on hold while a con-
sultant is summoned. Plainly such a delay from speaking up 
would intolerably burden the administration of emergency care, 
raising B sharply. 
The probable harm to a patient from emergency treatment 
(PI * L), will vary depending on the nature of the emergency 
and the type of treatment. The Hand formula shows a perverse 
result here, however. In the usual case, negligence is defined as a 
failure to take a precaution that would cost less than the proba-
ble harm resulting from not taking the precaution. The assump-
tion is that taking the precaution will reduce the probable harm, 
either by decreasing its likelihood, or decreasing the magnitude 
of the harm, or both. In an emergency, taking the precaution of 
speaking up has the effect of increasing the probable harm. An 
emergency is a situation that by definition requires prompt ac-
tion, and speaking up delays that prompt action; a delay means 
the patient's probable harm will be greater than if prompt ac-
tion had been taken. 
Thus, the burden and the probable harm are dependent on 
each other in a way that renders the Hand formula awkward for 
assessing negligence in an emergency. The formula also requires 
a closer look at the probability from the employee's perspective 
that the emergency treatment selected is the wrong one (P2). In 
an emergency, the likelihood that a treatment is incorrect is 
higher than in a uonemergency. Under the press of time, careful 
laboratory tests and other diagnostic measures obviously cannot 
be undertaken. An increase in P2 over nonemergencies suggests 
that employees should speak up in emergencies. But recall that 
P2 is the probability from the employees' perspective that a 
treatment decision is incorrect, not the probability judged by an 
omniscient observer or with hindsight. In an emergency, it is just 
as difficult for an employee to be certain about a treatment as 
the treating physician. If the employee is unable to make a rea-
soned assessment of the probable incorrectness of the treatment, 
the natural presumption would be that probability is low and 
therefore the employee need not speak up. Emergencies, then, 
are the primary occasions for which speaking up should not be 
encouraged by a finding of employee liability. 
Now let us shift the focus to a situation of gradual patient 
deterioration. The lack of time pressure means that the burden 
on orderly hospital functioning will be very low if an employee 
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requests that someone review the physician's treatment. There 
will be plenty of time for a review, which in many cases can be 
satisfied by having employees such as nurses simply confer with 
a nursing supervisor or stop and question a resident making 
rounds. Second, the probability that a patient is suffering harm 
gradually rises as time passes and deterioration continues. Natu-
rally, the amount of loss, L, will increase also, because deteriora-
tion means increasing damage. Finally, with time for reflection, 
an employee can better assess the likelihood that the treating 
physician has erred. Situations of progressive deterioration, 
then, are the ones in which liability for not speaking up should 
be, and in fact seem to be, most readily found. 
VI. DoEs IT MATTER? 
If courts instinctively are responding to the conflicting pres-
sures on employees who commit type 1 and type 2 errors, per-
haps the fact that their intuitive judgments are not well articu-
lated or consistent should make no difference. But to describe 
the situation as one of poorly articulated inconsistency is to sug-
gest that it does make a difference. Perhaps not in the clear-cut 
cases, for almost any rule takes care of gross departures from 
whatever standard is set, but certainly the choice of rule will 
make a difference in closer cases. Several cases have arisen in 
which the analysis proposed in this Article would have made a 
difference. 
One case, for example, that raises the problem of who 
should testify in speaking up litigation is Schwartz v. Boston 
Hospital for Women.179 In Schwartz, a patient's treating physi-
cian had ordered the hospital staff to perform a curettage on the 
patient after a Caesarean section. The patient later suffered 
from an infection and sterility, which she alleged was caused in 
part by the failure of the staff to object to the order for the cu-
rettage. The patient introduced an affidavit from a physician 
stating that the curettage was a departure from the medical 
standard of care, but evidently offered no other evidence on this 
point. The hospital moved for summary judgment on the issue. 
The court quoted the Toth rule that a hospital employee is 
not liable for carrying out an order unless the order is "'clearly 
179. 422 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
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contraindicated by normal practice.' "~80 On the basis of the affi-
davit concerning common medical practice, the court denied the 
hospital's motion.181 The affidavit was couched in terms of what 
was accepted medical practice-not what was accepted nursing 
practice. The expert, an obstetrician-gynecologist, said specifi-
cally that "[i]t was a deviation from customary and usual obstet-
rical procedures" for the treating physician to have ordered the 
curettage.182 Nothing mentioned in the court's opinion justified a 
jury finding that nurses should have recognized the curettage as 
clearly contraindicated. On a motion for summary judgment, the 
affidavit was probably enough to support denial of the motion. 
The absence of any discussion of the affidavit or of what sort of 
testimony would be necessary at trial nevertheless suggests that 
the court did not recognize the issue. 
In another New York case, Kileen v. Reinhardt/83 a patient 
allergic to penicillin was hospitalized for asthma. While in the 
hospital, her private physicians ordered the administration at 
different times of two drugs, Cephalotin and Dilaudid, that may 
have been contraindicated for patients with a penicillin allergy. 
The patient eventually died, though apparently more from a 
failure of her physicians to recognize that pneumonia compli-
cated the asthma than directly from the medication prescribed. 
In any event, part of the estate's suit was against the hospital on 
the theory that the ·hospital staff should have countermanded 
the orders of medication.184 At trial, the jury entered a general 
verdict for the plaintiff after the submission of this and several 
other theories of hospital liability. 
On appeal, the court cited Toth for the proposition that 
physicians' orders must be followed unless clearly contraindi-
cated and observed that "[o]n this record, it cannot be con-
cluded that the administration of both of these drugs was so 
clearly contraindicated as to cast liability upon the hospital. "185 
Significantly, the court said nothing about the trial judge's con-
180. Schwartz, 422 F, Supp. at 55 (quoting Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 
255, 265 n.3, 239 N.E.2d 368, 374 n.3, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440, 449 n.3 (1968)) (applying New 
York law). 
181. Schwartz, 422 F. Supp. at 56. 
182. /d. 
183. 71 A.D.2d 851, 419 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1979). 
184. ./d. at 853, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 177. 
185. /d. 
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elusions on this point. ·Whether the trial judge had applied the 
Toth rule at all, whether the application of that rule had been 
erroneous or clearly en:oneous, or whether any expert testimony 
existed to provide substantial evidence in support of a con~lu­
sion of liability by the jury, was not addressed. The appellate 
court must therefore have decided the issue itself as a matter of 
law. By not referring to any expert testimony, the court must 
have meant that the question of clear contraindication was to be 
determined from the viewpoint of a layperson. In sum, the court 
held that the administration of Cephalotin and Dilaudid to a pa-
tient allergic to penicillin is not something clearly contraindi-
cated to laypersons. 
That holding is undoubtedly correct. Most laypersons would 
not know whether the drugs were clearly contraindicated. But if 
the question of contraindication is to be judged from a nurse's 
perspective, as Toth seems to require, 186 the outcome of this is-
sue should have been different. Expert testimony from nurses 
about the administration of specified drugs would have been 
necessary in a new trial. It is entirely possible that nurses would 
know that certain medications are contraindicated, and perhaps 
even clearly contraindicated, for patients who are allergic to 
penicillin. 
Finally, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hunt v. Bogalusa 
Community Medical Center,187 held a hospital liable for the fail-
ure to override a physician's decision to put up partial bedside 
rails for a sedated, seventy-three-year-old patient with a history 
of strokes and dizziness. Partial rails extend from the head of 
the bed about half-way toward the foot. Full rails run the length 
of the bed. The patient injured herself falling from the bed and 
sued the hospital. At trial, there was mixed testimony about 
whether full rails provided any more protection from falling 
than partial rails. A trial court judgment for the patient was re-
versed by the Louisiana Court of Appeals because testimony 
showed that most hospitals would have used partial rails in the 
same circumstances, unless ordered by a physician to use full 
rails. The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, reinstated the 
judgment for the patient. The court pretermitted the question of 
community standards for hospitals and effectively determined 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97. 
187. ~03 So. 2d 745 (La. 1974). 
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that the hospital should have overriden the physician's orders to 
use partial rails.188 
It is nearly impossible to figure out what rule or standard 
the court applied to reach its conclusion. Nothing at all is men-
tioned in the opinion about obvious negligence or substantial de-
partures from established standards or any similar formulation. 
Because other hospitals routinely used partial rails and because 
the physician in this case actually ordered partial rails, the hos-
pital should not have been liable. Certainly, it would be hard to 
maintain that partial rails were either obviously wrong to a 
layperson or a substantial departure from medical custom. Nor 
did the evidence show that partial rails were wrong from the 
viewpoint of a trained physician. Yet, because the court rein-
stated a jury verdict that·conflicted with expert testimony about 
hospital practic.e, the court must have judged the requirement 
for speaking up from the viewpoint of a layperson. Hunt is 
therefore an altogether unsatisfactory case. 
Varying standards or duties, then, can make a difference in 
the outcome of a case. 'rhe existing formulations of various du-
ties do not make clear who is to testify about employee liability. 
If a duty to speak up is imposed for errors perceived by a 
layperson, then the jury itself can reach a conclusion; if the 
viewpoint is that of the employee, then other employees should 
testify; if the viewpoint is that of a physician, then only physi-
cians need testify. Confusion about who needed to testify was 
the heart of the error in Schwartz, as noted above, and certainly 
might have made a difference in both Hunt and Kileen. 
VII. CoNCLUSION 
A review of the cases and a cost-benefit analysis show that 
courts are generally on the right track in finding and denying 
liability in the speaking up situation. The problem lies in the 
courts' over-reliance on intuition to set widely differing duties 
on employees, duties that offer only vague guidelines to employ-
ees and to future courts. In close cases, these disparate concepts 
of duty may well lead to the wrong results. If hospital liability is 
expanding as rapidly as some commentators assert, 189 these 
188. !d. at 747. 
189. See Southwick, supra note 25, at 430; Note, supra note 16, at 343. 
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questions about liability for speaking up will likely arise more 
and more frequently. Courts need a sturdier framework to allow 
for principled decision making. Rather than repeatedly referring 
to ambiguous duties, courts should develop an approach that re-
lies on a broadly stated standard of care and then focuses on 
how a breach of that standard should be established. The stan-
dard would be that of the reasonable employee; a breach of that 
standard would be shown by. the testimony of similarly trained 
employees. 
A shift from a particularized duty approach to a broader 
standard of reasonable care approach is preferred by courts in 
other torts cases190 and was espoused by Prosser191 as the more 
satisfactory approach to negligence questions. Aside from this 
general rationale, there is the added benefit to a standard of care 
analysis that employee liability would be placed on the same 
footing as physician liability in malpractice cases. Courts do not 
customarily assert, for example, that physicians have a duty not 
to sew forceps inside a patient, even though any number of cases 
would justify that conclusion. Rather, courts assert that physi-
cians must comport with a standard of customary medical pru-
dence;192 the only question in the sewn-up-forceps type of case is 
whether, under the circumstances, leaving the forceps was a de-
parture from that standard.193 There is no reason that this same 
approach would not work equally well in· speaking up cases. 
The proper approach, then, is not to set duties at all, but to 
rely on a general standard of care and to hold employees liable 
for not speaking up in circumstances in which testimony shows 
that other, similar, prudent employees would speak up. In the 
normal case, because juries cannot be expected to sense the 
pressures of compliance with medical directives, let alone appre-
190. See, e.g., Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (former obligation of 
plaintiffs to stop, look, and listen at railroad crossings replaced with an obligation to 
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 
443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (landowners' differing obligations to licensees, invi-
tees, and trespassers replaced with a single obligation to exercise due care); Darling v. 
Charleston Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 
946 (1966). 
191. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, § 53, at 356. 
192. Hernandez v. United States, 636 F.2d 704, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Erickson v. 
United States, 504 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D. 1980). 
193. See, e.g., Burke v. Washington Hosp. Center, 475 F.2d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 
1973); City of Somerset v. Hart, 549 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Ky. 1977). 
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ciate the assessment of probabilities of harm and incorrect treat-
ment, liability should be based only on expert testimony. If a 
nurse is a defendant, then other nurses should testify to what 
reasonable nurses would do. If an X-ray technician is a defend-
ant, then other technicians should testify, and so on. The semi-
nal case of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospi-
tal, 194 despite its other drawbacks, came close to this approach. 
The court discussed the difference between a duty and a stan-
dard of care analysis, and addressed the question whether ex-
perts from other hospitals ·should have been required to testify 
for the plaintiff. The court concluded that a standard of care can 
be established by expert testimony or by written procedures, 
which includes health regulations, accreditation standards, and 
hospital by-laws.195 In all, Darling satisfactorily focused on the 
issue of standards of care but regrettably has not been widely 
followed on that point. 
Naturally, just as with cases of a physician's negligence, 
there will be situations in which the court is entitled to conclude 
that expert testimony is unnecessary. In Czubinsky v. Doctor's 
Hospital/96 for example, a physician ordered a nurse to leave a 
postoperative patient to assist the physician in another surgical 
procedure elsewhere in the hospital. The nurse's leaving violated 
hospital regulations and left the patient, who died from a car-
diac arrest, inadequately attended. The trial court had entered a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the hospital because 
the plaintiff offered no expert testimony on nursing standards. 
The appeals court reversed because the nurse had displayed a 
"[w]ant of care ... so obvious as to render expert testimony 
unnecessary. "197 
These exceptional situations in which expert testimony is 
194. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E. 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). 
195. Id. at 330-31, 211 N.E.2d at 256. See generally, Recent Decisions, Hospitals, 
supra note 38, at 743-49. See also Alexander v. Gonser, 42 Wash. App. 234, 240, 711 P.2d 
347, 351 (1985), which says that the standard of care in corporate negligence cases (i.e., 
those in which policies or procedures are involved) is generally set by the accreditation 
standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and by the hospital's 
own by-laws. Despite Darling's assertions, written standards will seldom eliminate the 
need for expert testimony because written standards cannot specify when a physician's 
negligence is "obvious" or "clear." Darling is a rare case precisely because the physician's 
conduct was so egregious. 
196. 139 Cal. App. 3d 361, 188 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1983). 
197. /d. at 367, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 688. 
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unnecessary can be assessed on a case-by-case basis, just as they 
are in cases of a physician's negligence. Indeed, the whole point 
of adopting a reasonably prudent employee standard for speak-
ing up cases is that it would function exactly like the univer-
sally-used reasonably prudent physician standard. Courts are 
thoroughly familiar with the latter standard. Relying on it for 
employee speaking up cases would be simple, would be consis-
tent with other medical malpractice actions and would avoid the 
problems of conflicting formulations of various duties that have 
made the existing decisions so confusing. 
The prudent employee standard would automatically elimi-
nate the need to choose among an obvious negligence standard, 
a substantial departure standard, and all the other standards. It 
would inevitably focus on the employee's viewpoint, not a physi-
cian's or a layperson's, a focus that previous discussion has 
shown to be preferable. And finally, it would neatly bypass the 
misleading and distinctly unhelpful approaches based on corpo-
rate negligence or hospital standards of care. The prudent em-
ployee test may or may not make the outcome of speaking up 
cases more predictable than they are presently, but at least it 
would be frank in its unpredictability, consistent with and no 
worse than the test for physicians' liability, and it would mini-
mize the ease with which results can be manipulated. It has 
much to commend it. 
